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I. INTRODUCTION
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed the depor-
tation relief of two Mexican women, Sara and Elena,' arguing that the
women had failed to meet the statutory requirements to forestall their
deportation. The INS argued that the women did not demonstrate that
their expulsion would result in extreme hardship to themselves and their
children.2 The INS focused on the tender age of the women's children,
1 To protect the identity of the women whose stories and cases I use in this article, I
have changed their names. Sara is represented by faculty and students at the St.
Mary's University School of Law Immigration Clinic. Her case materials are on file
with the author. Elena is represented by the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project in
Seattle, Washington. Briefs in her case are on file with the author.
2 The women had applied to suspend their deportation under §244(a)(1), (3) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1), (3) (1994). The statute
provided:
As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his
discretion suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien (other than an alien
described in §1251(a)(4) (D) of this title) who applies to the Attorney General
for suspension of deportation and-
(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions
specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately
preceding the date of such application, and proves that during all of such period
he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose
deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme
hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence;
(3) is deportable under any law of the United States except section
1251(a)(1)(G) of this title and the provisions specified in paragraph (2); has been
physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 3
years immediately preceding the date of such application; has been battered or
subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States by a spouse or parent who is a
United States citizen or lawful permanent resident (or is the parent of a child of a
United States citizen or lawful permanent resident and the child has been
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States by such citizen or
permanent resident parent); and proves that during all of such time in the United
States the alien was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person
whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in
extreme hardship to the alien or the alien's parent or child.
The statute continues to provide relief from deportation to eligible non-citizens
placed in deportation proceeding prior to April 1, 1997, the effective date of the Ille-
gal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). With the passage of
IIRAIRA, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009 (1996), Congress repealed INA §244 but preserved relief for undocumented
victims of domestic violence under a new form of deportation relief INA §240A(b), 8
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their moderate but not lengthy residence in the United States, the
absence of any involvement in their communities, and their ties to
extended family in Mexico.' The INS's arguments are not unusual and, in
fact, are consistent with historical interpretation of hardship claims in
deportation cases.4 However, the INS's opposition in the two women's
cases is troubling because both women are victims of domestic violence
and had relied on provisions of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
(VAWA)5, which is designed to aid domestic violence victims.6
Immigration judges had granted the applications based on findings of
extreme hardship, on evidence that the women and their children had
been subjected to severe physical and emotional abuse, and that they
feared return to Mexico where the legal system would not afford them
U.S.C. 1229b (Supp II. 1994) (cancellation of removal). For discussion of IIRAIRA,
see infra at Section II, B. Battered spouses and children placed in deportation pro-
ceedings prior to April 1, 1997 apply under INA §244(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1254 (a) (3)
(1995) for suspension of deportation. Those in newly designated removal proceedings
instituted after April 1, 1997, apply under INA §240A(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1229b (Supp. II
1994) for cancellation of removal. See infra notes 14 & 30.
3 See briefs relating to Sara and Elena, supra note 1.
4 The two principle cases which interpret extreme hardship are Matter of
Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978) and INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981). In
Anderson, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) set forth the factors to be
considered in extreme hardship determinations. Anderson at 597. The Supreme
Court in Wang held that the responsibility for defining this ambiguous term lies with
the Attorney General and her delegates and furthermore, sanctioned a narrow
construction of the term. Wang at 144 - 45. The case which typifies the narrow
interpretation of extreme hardship and cites to other similar cases is Hernandez-
Patino v. INS, 831 F.2d 750, 754-55 (7' Cir. 1987). See further discussion and
additional cases, infra Section III.
5 VAWA is a part of the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
6 Id. at §40701-40703. The immigration provisions of VAWA were codified at INA
§§ 204(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(1994); 204(a)(1)(B)(2), 8 U.S.C.
1154(a)(1)(B)(2) (1994); 204(a)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1994);
216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c)(4) (1994); 244(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(3) (1994); 244(g), 8
U.S.C. 1254(g) (1994). Along with provisions to aid undocumented victims of U.S.
citizens and permanent residents, VAWA provides other measures targeting the
problem of domestic violence, including authorization for the interstate enforcement
of protective orders (18 U.S.C. §2265); creation of a federal offense for crossing state
lines to injure, harass, or intimidate a partner (18 U.S.C. §2261); funds for public
education and provisions for a national domestic violence hotline (42 U.S.C. §10416-
18); appropriations for battered women's shelters (42 U.S.C. §10409(a));
confidentiality for victims and counselors (42 U.S.C. §§13942, 13951); grants to states
for training of law enforcement (42 U.S.C. §3796hh); and a civil rights claim with the
right to sue for punitive damages for gender motivated crimes (42 U.S.C. §13981). See
also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, §§40701-40703.
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protection.7 In each case the INS appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA),8 sharply criticized the courts' findings, and minimized the
extent to which the women's abuse should be considered in the assess-
ment of "extreme hardship."9 For example, the INS argued in Sara's case
that "the immigration judge gave too much weight to the sole fact the
respondent was a battered wife."'
7 Sara was found to have suffered abuse at the hands of her husband, Joe, a legal
resident. Shortly after the birth of his first child, Joe began verbally abusing his wife.
The violence turned physical, particularly after the birth of the couple's second child.
Sara was hit, kicked, and threatened with weapons by her husband. Sara testified she
would find no legal protection in Mexico. An expert witness Lic. Roberto Rosas, a
Mexican attorney and now law professor, testified on the lack of resources in Mexico
to support battered women. The judge granted Sara's application for suspension of
deportation under INA §244(a)(1), but was forced to deny her application for VAWA
suspension under INA §244(a)(3) because Sara had made a departure from the
United States within the three years preceding her final deportation hearing. Brief,
casual, and innocent departures from the United States do not interrupt the required
physical presence for §244(a)(1) suspension. See INA §244(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1254
(b)(2) (1994). However, VAWA drafters committed an apparent error and failed to
amend the suspension of deportation statute to excuse brief departures made by
applicants for INA §244(a)(3) relief. Id. Notwithstanding her technical ineligibility
for VAWA suspension, the judge determined that because she was a victim of
domestic violence, she would suffer extreme hardship. "However the hardship of
deporting her to Mexico results from the fact that even though she does not meet the
three year time requirement, there is no escaping that she is, in fact, a battered
spouse." Decision in case of Sara, supra note 1, at 9.
The immigration judge who heard Elena's case granted her application under INA
§244(a)(3) (1994). Elena also had suffered severe battery and abuse by her legal
permanent resident boyfriend, Adam, who was also the father of her child. On one
occasion, Adam beat Elena, forced her into his car, and punched her until she bled.
He then dumped her along the side of a road, hours from her home. Elena testified
that she feared return to Mexico. Adam frequently traveled to Mexico and had
threatened Elena and her family. Elena believed she would not be able to depend on
the Mexican police for protection. Maria Lopez, a mental health professional who
had lived and studied in Mexico, supported Elena's testimony. See brief relating to
Elena, supra note 1.
8 The BIA and the corps of immigration judges are part of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR). CHARLES GORDAN, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN
YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, §3.04 (1998) [hereinafter
GORDAN, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR]. The EOIR and the INS are separate agencies
within the Department of Justice, but both remain under the ultimate authority of the
Attorney General. Id.
9 See briefs relating to Sara and Elena, supra note 1.
1o Service Brief in Support of Appeal at 12-13, Case of Sara, supra note 1.
Likewise, the INS brief supporting the government appeal in Elena's case was critical
of the court's extreme hardship finding, and suggested the respondent was motivated
to seek residence to obtain U.S. services. "[T]he birth of a U.S. citizen child and
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The decision of Congress to include "extreme hardship" as an eligibil-
ity standard and the INS responses in these and other cases threaten to
undermine the advances made previously by VAWA to aid immigrant vic-
tims of domestic violence.11 Heralded as the most significant legislation
to aid victims of domestic violence, 2 VAWA was enacted in recognition
of the fact that domestic violence is a serious national problem in the
United States and that the undocumented immigration status of victims
and their fear of deportation exacerbates domestic abuse.3 The immi-
gration provisions of the law were significant because, for the first time,
deportation relief was afforded specifically to battered and abused
spouses and children of United States citizens and permanent residents. 4
Additionally, undocumented victims of domestic violence were allowed
to self-petition in order to become lawful residents without the assistance
desire to take advantage of U.S. social services does not constitute 'extreme
hardship."' INS Brief, Case of Elena, supra note 1.
11 For other articles concerning VAWA and critical of provisions which undermine
the goal to aid battered immigrants, see Janet Calvo, The Violence Against Women
Act: An Opportunity for the Justice Department to Confront Domestic Violence, 72
INTERPRETER RELEASES 485 (Apr. 10, 1995) [hereinafter Calvo, The Violence Against
Women Act]; Janet Calvo, Domestic Policy in an Immigration Context: The
Immigration Law Provisions of the Violence Against Women Act (forthcoming;
manuscript on file with the author) [hereinafter Calvo, Domestic Policy]; Felicia E.
Franco, Unconditional Safety for Conditional Immigrant Women, 11 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 99 (1996) [hereinafter Franco, Unconditional Safety]; Linda Kelly,
Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving the Beatings of 1996, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
303 (1997) [hereinafter Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors]; Linda Kelly, Stories from
the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence Against Women
Act, 92 NW.U. L.REv. 665 (1998) [hereinafter Kelly, Stories from the Front]; Ryan
Liienthal, Old Hurdles Hamper New Options for Battered Immigrant Women, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1595 (1996) [hereinafter Lilienthal, Old Hurdles].
12 See Department of State News Release, Mar. 21, 1995. See also Donna E.
Shalala, Domestic Violence is Not a Private Matter: A Comprehensive Approach to
Preventing and Ending the Violence, 26 U. WEST L. A. L. REV. 29, 31 (1995) (noting
that VAWA is part of the federal government's commitment to detect and end
domestic violence).
13 See discussion on the legislative history of VAWA, infra Section II.
14 Prior to the passage of VAWA, undocumented battered women and children
facing deportation had to meet the requirements of general suspension of deportation
relief available to undocumented non-citizens. INA §244(a)(1). Deportation relief
under VAWA, INA §244(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(3) (1994), affords battered
immigrants a less restrictive avenue for avoiding deportation. See Gail Pendleton,
Immigration Relief for Women and Children Suffering Abuse, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
IN IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE COMMUNrrEs: ASSERTING THE RIGHTS OF BATrERED
WOMEN 65-66 (2NM ed. 1997) [hereinafter Pendleton, Immigration Relief for Women
and Children Suffering Abuse]. Since the passage of IRAIRA, relief from removal
proceedings is available under INA §240A(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2) (Supp. II
1994). See supra note 2.
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of their U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse or parent.' 5 VAWA
commands that immigration laws remedy rather than perpetuate violence
in families of citizens and lawful permanent residents.'6
This article will address problems faced by undocumented women 17
who are victims of domestic violence and who, as they seek the benefits
of VAWA, attempt to prove they will suffer extreme hardship if deported.
In passing the immigration provisions of VAWA, Congress intended to
provide protection to battered immigrant women and to remove deporta-
tion as a tool of the abuser.' The addition of "extreme hardship" as an
eligibility standard is entirely inappropriate for this class of immigrants
and is prone to interpretations which are unrelated to the problems and
needs of domestic violence victims. 9 Determinations in cases of battered
immigrants must be based on consideration of the factors tied to domestic
violence, including the nature and extent of abuse suffered by the victim
and her need for support of U.S. social and legal systems.
The background of the "extreme hardship" standard and the dialogue
between the agency 2° and the federal courts over the construction and
15 See INA §204(a)(1)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. §1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(Supp. 11 1994); INA
§204(a)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §1154(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1994).
16 The legislative history to VAWA provides ample support for Congressional
intent to amend immigration laws to provide protection for battered immigrants. See
Section II, infra.
17 Women are not the only victims of domestic violence. Children, and in some
cases men, can be victims of family violence. The immigration provisions of VAWA
benefit spouses, including men, and children of abusive U.S. citizens and legal
residents. INA §204(a)(1)(A)(iii); INA §204(a)(1)(B)(ii); INA §244(a)(3); INA
§240A(b)(2). For the sake of simplicity, I do not refer to children each time I discuss
victims of domestic violence. I also do not refer to men, since the vast majority of
adult victims are women. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, DEP'T JUST., Report to the
Nation - Crime and Justice: The Data 21 (1983) (reporting that 95% of adult victims
are women). Additionally, I use the term "undocumented" or "non-citizen" rather
than the more pejorative "illegal alien" to refer to the status of foreign nationals who
have entered the United States without authorization or who have entered lawfully
but thereafter have violated the terms of their permission to stay. The term "illegal
alien" has a negative connotation and fosters the stereotype of foreign nationals as
criminals. I use the term "alien" only when I refer to statutory provisions that include
that term.
18 See Section II, infra.
19 See infra Section III. See also Kelly, supra note 11, at 684-685; Calvo, Domestic
Policy, supra note 11.
20 1 use the word "agency" to refer to the Attorney General, the Department of
Justice, and components within the Department, the INS and the EOIR, responsible
for implementation of immigration laws. See GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR,
supra note 8 at §3.01(1). The Attorney General is authorized to implement the
immigration provisions of VAWA and for interpretation of certain terminology, most
notably "extreme hardship." The actual rule-making and decision-making is divided
between the INS, which adjudicates visa petitions and the EOIR, which reviews
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application of the term will be examined." Extreme hardship determina-
tions mirror the struggle between the government's enforcement con-
cerns and the ameliorative nature of the relief to which extreme hardship
is tied. Historically, courts have deferred to the government's concern to
control immigration by narrowly construing "extreme hardship." When
the agency and reviewing courts consider whether a foreign national will
suffer extreme hardship if expelled, they frequently assign little weight to
the social, economic, and political conditions of the home country.22 Yet,
for many battered immigrant women, the conditions they face abroad are
a significant aspect of the hardship they and their families will suffer.
Mexican victims of domestic violence face considerable adversity if
deported. This article will focus on the inappropriateness of the addition
of "extreme hardship" as a requirement for VAWA applicants as illus-
trated by Mexican women, who account for a significant number of
VAWA applicants.23 VAWA applications will be discussed in the context
of the factors which Mexican women must set forth to convince the INS
and immigration courts that they and their families will suffer "extreme
hardship." For instance, Mexican women quite often cite the failure of
their own country to protect victims as a major cause for their fear of
deportation and their need to obtain the benefits of VAWA.24 While
domestic violence is becoming a public issue in Mexico, it lags behind the
United States in terms of providing substantive legal remedies and social
applications for relief from deportation. See Michael G. Heyman, Discretionary
Adjudicatory Rulemaking: Due Process of Lawmaking and Immigration Law, 11 GEo.
IMMIGR. L.J. 83, 86 (1996) [hereinafter Heyman, Discretionary Adjudicatory
Rulemaking] for his discussion on Congress' delegation of authority to interpret laws
to the agency and how entities within the agency engage in rulemaking.
21 See infra Section III on the history of extreme hardship. Congress has never
defined the term despite its inclusion in many sections of the statute, and instead left
the task of defining extreme hardship to the agency. Agency determinations of
extreme hardship have prompted considerable litigation but the role federal courts
will continue to play in the dialogue is highly uncertain given Congress' recent
attempts to curtail federal court review of immigration matters. See infra Section IV.
22 See Matter of Anderson and infra Section III.
23 See infra Section V. For this discussion I draw from my experiences as well as
those of my students while representing battered Mexican women at St. Mary's
University School of Law Immigration Clinic. The Clinic was organized in 1994 to
provide law students with practical training and to meet the needs of an under-served
immigrant community in South Texas. In 1995, following the passage of VAWA, the
Clinic, together with the Law School's Human Rights Clinic, began assisting battered
immigrant women, most of whom are citizens of Mexico.
24 In most of the cases of Mexican women handled by the St. Mary's Clinics, the
VAWA applicants have recounted problems they or other domestic violence victims
have had in Mexico obtaining protection and services. See discussion, Section V,
infra.
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services to deal with domestic abuse. 25 Mexican women face significant
barriers to protection from domestic abuse in their country. Undocu-
mented Mexican women in the United States will encounter substantial
risks if they fail in their efforts to convince government adjudicators of
their concerns and they are deported.26
This article concludes by offering several proposals. Congress should
heed concerns raised by immigrants that the INS and immigration courts
discount or ignore altogether factors relevant to undocumented victims of
domestic violence.27 "Extreme hardship" should be removed as a stan-
dard for eligibility. Alternatively, the Department of Justice should
define "extreme hardship" consistent with the purposes of the VAWA
and take steps to eliminate disparate agency determinations of hardship.
If retained as an eligibility standard, extreme hardship should be utilized
not as a device for enforcement of immigration controls. Although the
Department of Justice has recognized that "extreme hardship" should be
broadly construed to encompass consideration of factors tied to domestic
violence,28 the agency's measures are insufficient. Effective response to
the needs of undocumented victims of domestic violence and the dangers
posed by expulsion to countries that provide little or no protection could
occur by Congress eliminating the requirement of "extreme hardship."
25 Only in Mexico, D.F., have Mexican legislators passed laws to address specific
civil and criminal remedies for victims of domestic violence. See discussion infra at
Section V.
26 The conditions a battered woman may face if returned to a country like Mexico,
which fails to protect victims of domestic violence, is but one factor which the INS
and immigration courts must consider in VAWA cases. See discussion infra Section
IV. There are many others. In fact, some battered immigrants face return to
countries which potentially provide ample protection, but nevertheless, will face
extreme hardships by being uprooted from the United States following the trauma of
battery and cruelty.
27 See infra note 93 for discussion of legislative proposals advocated by a network
of battered immigrant supporters.
28 On March 26, 1996, the Department of Justice issued interim regulations for
purposes of guiding adjudication of VAWA self-petitions. See 61 Fed. Reg. 13,061-
13,079 (1996). The agency also issued a high-level memorandum to all field offices on
April 16, 1996. See Memorandum dated April 16, 1996 by T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Executive Associate Commissioner (on file with the author). The preamble to the
regulations and the memorandum set forth a number of factors to be considered in
the assessment of extreme hardship determinations. See 61 Fed Reg. 13,061, 13,067
(1996). Then, in October 1998, the INS issued a memorandum addressing extreme
hardship as used for VAWA self-petitions. See Memorandum dated October 16, 1998
by Paul W. Virtue, General Counsel (on file with the author). Finally, on May 21,
1999, the Department of Justice issued regulations for purposes of VAWA-related
suspension of deportation and cancellation of removal. See 64 Fed. Reg. 27856, 27863
(1999). As argued in Section IV, these and other steps taken by the agency are
laudatory but have not prevented actions within the agency which limit the law's
protections of undocumented battered women. See infra Section IV.
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In the alternative, the agency must adopt a new approach to making
"extreme hardship" determinations in VAWA cases, one not based on a
case by case consideration of multiple factors which may or may not
relate to domestic violence, but one which embraces a rebuttable pre-
sumption that immigrant victims of domestic violence meet the "extreme
hardship" criteria.
If Congress fails to remove "extreme hardship" as an eligibility factor
in VAWA cases and the agency refuses to establish a group specific defini-
tion29 of this ambiguous term, battered immigrants who are denied relief
because they fail to individually prove "extreme hardship" will likely be
left with few alternatives to expulsion from the United States. Avenues
previously available to immigrants seeking to appeal denials of adminis-
trative decisions are now barred,"0 as Congress has taken steps in recent
legislation to drastically curtail litigation of immigration cases.
II. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEIN Acr
In passing The Violence Against Women Act, Congress intended to
protect undocumented women from domestic violence and prevent fur-
ther violence at the hands of abusive United States citizen and legal resi-
dent spouses.31 VAWA recognizes the unique problems faced by these
women, denounces domestic violence, provides protection for victims,
29 The Department of Justice recently announced it will apply a group specific
definition of "extreme hardship" to benefit Salvadoran and Guatemalan applicants
for suspension of deportation under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central
American Relief Act of 1997 (NACARA), 64 Fed. Reg. 27856, 27864 (May 21, 1999).
See "'Hardship' Determination in NACARA Regulations Sparks Controversy, as
Clinton Administration Ponders Scope," 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES at 412-415 (Mar.
15,1999), and discussion infra Section IV. This approach to making extreme hardship
determinations is appropriate for VAWA applicants, who more often than not share
common characteristics.
30 In 1996, Congress passed two pieces of legislation, the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and the
IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. Together AEDPA and IIRAIRA
purport to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over a wide range of immigration
decisions. AEDPA §440(a) curtails judicial review of deportation orders relating to
non-citizens deportable for specified criminal offenses. IIRAIRA §306(b) repealed
INA §106, the section providing for judicial review of deportation and exclusion
orders, and replaced it with INA §242, which substantially limits review of removal
orders and discretionary decisions. See §242(a)(2)(B). As discussed in Section IV, B,
infra, the legislation will pose significant obstacles to litigation on behalf of battered
women who are denied VAWA relief administratively. See infra Section IV, B.
IIRAIRA also modified the relief provided undocumented victims of domestic
violence in the Crime Control Act. See infra Section II, B.
31 See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 28 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993).
10 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1
and promotes criminal sanctions for abuse.32 Immigration laws generally
place control over the immigration process on the spouse with legal sta-
tus, and Congress recognized that a non-citizen victim's dependence on
her U. S. citizen or legal resident spouse aggravated the abusive situa-
tion.3 3 VAWA was intended to send a strong message that "society will
not tolerate domestic violence,"3 4 and thus, must be interpreted to facili-
tate undocumented women's attainment of legal status, and furthermore,
to prevent the expulsion of those qualified immigrants from the United
States, where they have access to legal protections and services, to coun-
tries unable or unwilling to protect victims of domestic violence.3 5
A. Protecting Women from Violence
Prior to the passage of VAWA, Congress studied all aspects of domestic
and other violence against women, including the prevalence, severity and
frequency of violence; consequences to both victims and society; costs to
victims and society; and existing remedies and preventive programs.
3 6
32 See supra note 7 for codified sections. The statute is the first comprehensive
federal statute to provide remedies to victims of family violence. S. REP. No. 103-138
at 41, 42 (1993) (VAWA is a significant "step in forging a national consensus that our
society will not tolerate violence against women."). See also Kerrie E. Maloney,
Gender-Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights Provision of
the Violence Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1876, 1878
("Violence against women in the United States constitutes a national epidemic
mandating national intervention").
11 The impact of immigration law on women in general and women who are
victims of domestic violence has been the topic of a number of articles addressing the
plight of battered immigrant spouses following the Immigration Fraud Amendments
of 1986 (IMFA). See infra note 65 and accompanying text. See also Nancy Ann Root
& Sharyn A. Tejani, Undocumented: the Role of Women in Immigration Law, 83 GEO.
L.J. 605, 608-09 (1994) (immigration law may be gender-neutral when written, but in
application have unintentional negative consequences for women).
4 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993).
5 5See discussion infra at Section V. Mexican women often cite as a reason to stay
in the United States their fear of returning to Mexico where they will not receive legal
protections from further abuse by spouses able to travel abroad. The regulations
governing VAWA self-petitions and VAWA relief in deportation and removal
recognize as factors in determining "extreme hardship" the need of legal protections
and supportive services in the United States that are unavailable abroad, country
conditions that endanger a victim and her family, and the ability of the abuser to
travel abroad to locations where protection is not available. 61 Fed. Reg. 13061,
13067 (Mar. 26, 1996), 64 Fed. Reg. 27856, 27863; 8 C.F.R. 2458(c) (1996).
36 The legislative history of VAWA spans several years. Early versions of VAWA
were introduced in Senate in 1990 and the House in 1991. See Calvo, Domestic Policy,
supra note 11, at 15. In 1992, proposals to aid immigrant victims of domestic violence
were introduced. Id. at 13. In 1994, the VAWA with protections for immigrant
women, passed in the House. H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 1s Sess. The Senate version of
VAWA did not contain benefits for immigrants. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1' Sess. VAWA
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Congressional reports recognized that spousal abuse is a serious and per-
vasive problem affecting as many as four million women a year,37 and is
exacerbated by existing laws and practices. 38 Domestic abuse was found
to cross all economic classes, and affect all racial, ethnic and religious
groups.39 Congress found that in 1991 alone, at least 21,000 domestic
crimes were reported to police each week.4"
Victims of domestic violence suffer a wide range of injuries from beat-
ings, assaults with guns and other weapons, and sexual assaults. Of all
women who are murdered, one-third are killed by their husbands or boy-
friends.41 Moreover, women often suffer persistent, repeated acts of vio-
lence.42 An estimated 63% of domestic violence victims are beaten while
they are pregnant.43 Each year, at least one million victims of domestic
violence need medical attention as a result of their abuse.44 Congress
found that domestic violence is enormously expensive, costing from five
to ten billion dollars a year in health care, prosecution of offenders, and
other related costs.
4 5
The extent of domestic violence among immigrants in the United
States has not been determined. Congress relied on surveys indicating
was then considered in conference committee as part of the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Id. at 24.
37 See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 30 and H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26. This figure is
considered conservative. See Catherine Klein & Leslye Orloff, Providing Legal
Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21
HoFsTA L. REv. 801, 809 (1993). There are some scholars who estimate that as
many as 50-70% of women experience some violence during marriage. See Martha R.
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90
MICH. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1991) (citing LENORE WALKER, THm BATrERED WOMAN 19
(1979), JENNIFER B. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE 155 (1979), and SISTERHOOD IS
GLOBAL 703 (Robin Morgan ed., 1984)). Given that domestic violence is largely
unreported, it is difficult to provide accurate figures. Id. at 11. Moreover, many
surveys of domestic violence exclude the poor, the homeless, and those who do not
speak English. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1249 n. 29
(1991) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins].
38 Examples cited include police refusal to arrest abusers and the disparate
handling of crimes against victims of domestic violence by police, prosecutors, and
judges. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27; S. REp. No. 103-138, at 41.
39 See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37.
40 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37.
41 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41. See also Calvo, Domestic Policy, supra note 11.
42 See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 36-37. Unless there is intervention to prevent
further abuse, it will likely continue and even become worse. The Senate reported
that in over half of the cases in which women were murdered by their spouses, the
police had been called at least five times. Id. at 37.
43 See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26.
44 See S. REP. No. 103-138,, at 41.
45 See id.
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that, in the Latina immigrant community in the District of Columbia,
77% of women are victims of abuse.46 The rates cited by Congress are
quite high, yet understandable. Battered immigrants are often isolated
from a support system, might be unfamiliar with the legal system that
could come to their aid, and face greater obstacles due to language and
cultural barriers which hinder their ability to obtain protection and serv-
ices in comparison to their U.S. citizen counterparts.47 In many of these
cases, the women's spouses had refused to file immigration petitions to
legalize their status.48 Significant numbers of undocumented spouses are
deterred from leaving their abusers because they do not have the legal
status or the employment authorization necessary to support themselves
and their children.49 Congress noted that threats of deportation and the
fear of loss of child custody prevent foreign nationals from seeking help.5"
It found, "[m]any immigrant women live trapped and isolated in violent
homes afraid to turn to anyone for help. They fear continued abuse if
they stay, and deportation if they attempt to leave." 51 Even when an
46 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 26, 27 n. 13. Estimates of the level of violence
among immigrants vary, but are nonetheless substantial. In a study by the Coalition
for Immigrants Rights and Services, it was estimated that 48% of Latina immigrants
suffered from domestic violence. Michelle Anderson, A License to Abuse: the Impact
of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L.J. 1401 (1993) (citing Leslye
Orloff, Domestic Violence Bases Involving Immigrant and Refugee Communities: The
Response of the Courts in Family Violence: Issues of Public Policy and Government
Practice).
47 See Lesley Orloff, Deeana Jang, & Catherine Klein, With No Place to Turn:
Improving Legal Advocacy for Battered Immigrant Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 313, 316-17
(1995); Anderson, supra note 46, at 1404; Susan Girardo Roy, Reforming Hope or
Tolerating Abuse? Responses to Domestic Violence Against Immigrant Women, 9
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 263,267 (1995) (citing Christine Whalen & Martha King, Abuse in
a New Land - Immigrant Wives Often Isolated, Vulnerable, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 8,
1994, at Al.). See also notes and materials from Issues Facing Battered Immigrant
Women, presentation by Clemencia Prieto and Patricia Castillo at Seminar on
Battered Immigrant Women and Children: Remedies Available Under Family and
Immigration Law, September 18, 1998 (on file with author) (noting that Mexican
women unable to speak English and unaccustomed to a support system outside the
immediate family endure domestic violence longer than other U.S. victims).
Of course, if the figures cited by some that 50-70% of women experience violence
during marriage, see supra note 37, then the level of violence among immigrants
would be parallel to the general population.
48 See H. REP. No. 103-395, at 27 n. 13. Studies have reported that 64% of
undocumented battered Latinas refuse to seek assistance from social service agencies
out of fear of deportation; Anderson, supra note 46, at 1421 (citing CHRIs HOGELAND
& KAREN ROSEN, DREAMS LOST, DREAMS FOUND: UNDOCUMENTED WOMEN IN THE
LAND OF OPPORTUNrry,12-13 (1991)).
49 See H. REP. No. 103-395, at 26-27.
50 See id.
51 Id. at 26.
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abused spouse has access to United States courts and social service agen-
cies she may forego further legal protections and return to the abuser out
of the fear of deportation.52 Congress understood that many abused
immigrant women remain secluded in violent homes, fearing to take the
necessary steps to obtain help.53 In response to evidence that immigrant
women remain trapped in abusive relationships and that existing immi-
gration law fostered domestic violence by giving the abuser control of the
alien spouse's ability to gain permanent legal status, Congress intended to
create specific remedies for battered immigrant women.
54
1. Trouble in the Immigrant Family
Family reunification has long been a centerpiece of immigration law
and policy, 5 and the family-sponsored immigration is a major criterion
for obtaining immigration status in the United States.56 Control over the
process of immigration rested exclusively with the spouse who was an
U.S. citizen or permanent resident.57 In order to immigrate, non-citizens
52 Id. at 26-27. See also Krenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 37, at 1247
(immigrant women caught in even the most abusive relationship will withstand the
violence because of fear of deportation).
53 See id.
-4 See H.R. RnP. No. 103-395, at 26. See also Calvo, Domestic Policy, supra note
11, at 486. The House of Representatives found that domestic violence is "terribly
exacerbated in marriages where one spouse is not a citizen and the non-citizen's legal
status depends on his or her marriage to the abuser." H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 26.
55 GoRDON, MAILMAN, & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 8, at § 36.01 (rev. ed. 1997).
56 Of the 700,000 visas allocated each year to foreign nationals, 480,000 are
available to family members of United States citizens and permanent residents. INA
§201 (C)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1151 (C) (1) (A) (1994). Family-based visas are allocated
depending on whether the non-citizen is an immediate relative (spouse, parent, or
unmarried child) of a United States citizen, (INA §201(b), 8 U.S.C. 1151 (b) (1994)),
or comes within one of the four preference categories: 1) unmarried son or daughter
of a United States citizen (INA §203(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1153 (a) (1) (1994)); 2) the
spouse or unmarried son or daughter of a legal resident (INA §203(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
1153(a)(2)); 3) the married son or daughter of a United States citizen (INA
§203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(3)); or 4) the sibling of a United States citizen (INA
§203(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(4)). Non-citizens also may immigrate under the
employment based, diversity, and refugee categories. INA §203(b), 8 U.S.C.
1153(b)(five categories of employment-based visas); INA §203(c), 8 U.S.C. 1153(c)
(diversity); INA §208, 8 U.S.C. 1158 (asylum).
57 Longstanding provisions for immigrating family members have placed control of
the process on the United States citizen or legal resident spouse or parent seeking to
bring the alien relative to the United States. When the first numerical restrictions
were placed on immigration, the law required that a citizen or resident husband must
file the immigrant petition for his wife. Act of May 29, 1921, Pub. L. No. 5, §2(a), 42
Stat. 153, 159. See Janet Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacy of
Coverture, 28 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 593, 600-01 (1991) [hereinafter Calvo, Spouse-
Based Immigration Laws] for her insightful discussion of the history of immigration as
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must generally depend on their U.S. citizen or permanent resident rela-
tives to file an immigrant visa petition for them.5" In spouse-based immi-
gration, the abusing resident or citizen spouse often chooses not to
process an immigrant petition to legalize his non-citizen spouse. 59 This
left no avenue of relief to the alien spouse.60
However, even when the resident or citizen does initiate the immigra-
tion process for his spouse, the law presents other obstacles that exacer-
bate difficulties faced by victims of violence.6 ' In response to INS
charges that a significant number of marriage-related petitions were
fraudulent, Congress passed in 1986 the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments (IMFA), which extended the period of INS review of mar-
riage cases. 62 The IMFA created a conditional resident status for those
foreign national spouses married less than two years to United States citi-
it relates to women and the impact spouse-based immigration laws have had on
domestic violence. Early immigration provisions gave preference to male citizens and
legal residents seeking to immigrate their wives; women did not enjoy the same rights
to immigrate male relatives until the 1952 Act. Id. at 602-04. See also Kelly, Stories
From the Front, supra note 11, at 667-68.
58 The first step in the process of according a foreign national spouse with
permanent resident status is the filing by the United States citizen or legal resident
spouse of an immigrant visa petition (1-130). 8 C.F.R. §204.1(a) (1)(1997). Upon
approval, the foreign national beneficiary is designated as an immediate relative (if
the petitioner is a United States citizen), INA §201(b)(2)(A)(i), or a second
preference relative (if the petitioner is a legal resident). INA §203(a)(2). Immediate
relatives may immediately apply to adjust status or seek an immigrant visa from
abroad; second preference beneficiaries may seek permanent resident status once a
visa becomes available. See GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 8, at
§41.01(1)(a).
59 The non-citizen spouse is most often a woman. See infra note 266. See also
Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws, supra note 57, at 614 (citing Houstoun et al.,
Female Predominance of Immigration to the United States Since 1930: A First Look, 18
INT'L MIGRATION L. REV. 908, 909 (1984)).
60 See Matter of Cintron, 16 I&N Dec. 9 (BIA 1976).
61 Joe A. Tucker, Assimilation to the United States: A Study of the Adjustment of
Status and the Immigration Marriage Fraud Statutes, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 20, 26
(1989) [hereinafter Thcker, Assimilation to the United States].
62 See Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3538. INS charged that 30% of marriages
between foreign nationals seeking immigrant status and their United States citizens or
legal resident spouses were fraudulent. See lIcker, Assimilation to the United States,
supra note 61 (citing Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements to Obtain
Permanent Resident Status: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99'" Cong., 1" Sess. 35 (1985)
(statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, INS)). Subsequently, it was revealed that the
fraud claims were exaggerated and largely based on the opinion of INS investigators,
rather than on solid evidence. See INS Reveals Basis for Fraud Claims, 65
INTERPRETER RELEASES 26 (1988). IMFA is an example of immigration measures
which value enforcement over family unification. Id. at 26.
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zens or legal residents, and required the filing of a joint petition for
removal of the condition two years later.63 Failure to comply could lead
to the non-citizen's deportation.64 The statute was widely criticized for
effectively forcing immigrant victims of battery and abuse to stay in vio-
lent relationships because of fear of losing their immigrant status."
Following the passage of IMFA, Congress began to address the flaws in
family immigration law and the particular problems faced by battered
immigrant women. In response to reports that IMFA interfered with an
immigrant's ability to extract herself from an abusive situation,66 Con-
gress passed a battered spouse waiver as part of the Immigration Act of
1990,67 and thereby Congress loosened the control that an abusive spouse
could exert over his spouse's immigration status. The waiver removed
the joint filing requirement for conditional residents when the immigrant
spouse could establish that she had been battered or subjected to extreme
cruelty by her U.S. citizen or resident spouse. Nonetheless, while the
waiver of the joint filing requirements benefited many immigrant women,
it provided no relief to women whose abusive spouses refused to fie the
initial application for permanent residency or who filed and later with-
drew the application. Thus, while Congress had taken an important first
step by creating the battered spouse waiver it had not yet addressed the
crises facing battered women whose abusive husbands refused to initiate
the immigration process.
The existing legal framework for family reunification fell short of
addressing the needs of undocumented women who would normally ben-
efit from the family immigration system and aggravated problems faced
by victims of domestic violence.68 Congress acknowledged that it had to
seize control of the immigration process from abusive spouses and
63 See Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3538. Prior to IMFA, the foreign national
spouse would receive lawful residence unconditionally. Under IMFA, codified at
INA §216, lawful status is conditional on further review by the INS at the end of a
two-year period. Within a three month period before the second anniversary of her
conditional status, the resident and her spouse generally must file a joint petition to
remove the condition and appear at the INS for an interview. A waiver of the
requirement to file the joint petition was permitted if 1) the non-citizen could
demonstrate extreme hardship (INA §216(c)(4)(A)), or 2) the non-citizen obtained a
divorce and could demonstrate she entered the marriage in good faith (INA Section
216(c)(4)(B)). See INA § 216, 8 U.S.C. 1186(a) (1994).
64 See INA §237(a)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(1)(D) (Supp. II 1994).
65 See Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws, supra note 57; Anderson, supra
note 46; Margaret M. R. O'Herron, Ending the Abuse of the Marriage Fraud Act, 7
GEo. ImmiGR. L.J. 549 (1993); Anna Park, The Marriage Fraud Act Revised: The
Continuing Subordination of Asian and Pacific Islander Women, 1 AsIAN AMERicAN
& PACIFIC ISLANDER L.J. 29 (1993); Franco, supra note 11.
66 H. R. REP. No. 101-723, at 51-78 (1990).
67 Pub. L. No. 101-649, 101 Stat. 4978, INA §216(c)(4).
68 See Calvo, Domestic Policy, supra note 11.
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remove deportation as a tool of the abuser. By taking action to provide
relief to undocumented spouses of U.S. citizens and legal residents, Con-
gress would thereby address the problems of domestic violence and also
preserve the integrity of family-based immigration.
B. Immigrant Provisions of VAWA - A Step Forward and Backward
With VAWA, Congress closed the gap in remedies available to those
undocumented spouses and children who would normally benefit from
the U.S. immigration system, but could not attain legal status because
they are victims of domestic violence and abuse.69 The immigration pro-
visions of the statute provide two avenues to benefit undocumented bat-
tered spouses of legal residents and United States citizens, and if
successful in either instance, battered spouses acquires lawful resident
status without the aid of the abusive spouse or parent.70
69 See S. REP. No. 101-545, supra note 32.
70 VAWA does not provide benefits to undocumented battered women and
children whose abusive relatives are not U.S. citizens or legal residents, but there is
another avenue of relief available to some victims under U.S. refugee law which is
gradually beginning to recognize gender-based asylum claims. See Deborah Anker,
Nancy Kelly & Laura Gilbert, Women Whose Governments Are Unable or Unwilling
to Provide Reasonable Protection from Domestic Violence May Apply as Refitgees
Under United States Asylum Law, 11 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 709 (1997); Pamela Goldberg,
Asylum Law and Gender-Based Persecution, 94-9 IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS (Sept.
1994); Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of
Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625 (1993). See also Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele
E. Brasky, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue, 58 ALB. L. REv. 1119 (1995)
(while traditionally domestic violence has not been viewed as a human rights issue,
there is a growing recognition that international law can provide protection to
domestic violence victims). A refugee is defined as an individual who has a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. See INA §101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. §1101 (a)
(42). An individual in the United States who seeks refugee status may apply for
asylum under INA §208 or withholding of removal under §241(b)(3). See INA §208, 8
U.S.C. §1153; INA §241 (b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1251 (b) (3). In 1995, the INS promulgated a
series of guidelines for the adjudication of gender-based claims. See INS Office of
International Affairs, Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum
Claims from Women (May 26, 1995), reprinted in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASE 771, 781
(June 5, 1995). The guidelines recognize that domestic violence is a form of
persecution. "Forms of harm that have arisen in asylum claims and that are unique to
or commonly befall women have included ... domestic violence. . ." Id. at 9. In its
first opinion concerning a domestic violence victim applying for asylum, the Board in
Matter of R-A-, Int. Dec. 3403 (BIA 1999), ruled against the claimant, but stated "we
do not read the literal language of the [INA] actually to foreclose a construction that
would accord refugee status to a battered spouse." Id. at 9.
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First, the law permits a battered spouse to file a self-petition visa with
the INS.71 The domestic violence victim must establish her relationship
to, and the legal status of, her spouse and demonstrate that during the
marriage, which was entered into in good faith, she or her child has been
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty. She must also prove that she is
a person of good moral character and if deported, she, or her United
States citizen or legal resident child or parent will suffer extreme hard-
ship.72 Once approved, the beneficiary of a self-petition is eligible to
apply for permanent resident status.73
Second, a new form of relief was made available to battered spouses
and children facing deportation. Applicants against whom the INS initi-
ates deportation proceedings can apply to suspend those proceedings.
74
71 See INA §204(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) (spouse and children of
United States citizens); §204(a)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii) (spouse and
children of lawful permanent residents). The law permits the spouse and children
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a United States citizen or lawful resident
spouse/parent to submit a petition (Form 1-360) to the INS for designation as a
foreign national eligible to apply for immigrant status. Spouses who have not been
abused but whose children have suffered abuse may also submit a self-petition. Id.
72 See id. See Lauren Gilbert, Family Violence and the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 98-3 Immigration Briefings at 5-10 (Mar., 1998).
73 Spouses and children of United States citizens are considered immediate
relatives and may apply immediately for immigrant status. See INA §201(b)(2)(A)(i).
Spouses and children of lawful permanent residents fall under the preference
categories for visa allocation and must await visa availability before applying for
immigrant status. See INA §203(a)(2).
The beneficiary of a self-petition may apply with the INS an adjustment of status
application under INA §245. To be eligible to apply for adjustment of status, the
applicant must have been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.
See INA §245(a). In 1994, Congress amended §245 to permit applicants who had
illegally entered the United States to apply for adjustment. See INA §245(i).
However, the law expired in October, 1997, and Congress opted to not extend §245(i)
except for those non-citizens who had filed a visa petition by January 14, 1998. A visa
applicant who does not qualify to adjust status in the United States must depart the
country and apply abroad at a United States consulate. This presents a hardship to
battered spouses who may fear return to their country where they may encounter the
abusive spouse or where they may become stranded if the consulate refuses to issue
the visa. See Gilbert, supra note 72, at 10.
74 See INA §244(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1254(a)(3). The statute provides that the
Attorney General may suspend deportation and grant permanent resident status to
spouses and children who have been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by their
U.S. citizen or legal resident spouse or parent. The relief relaxes the requirements
generally provided to other aliens seeking suspension relief. VAWA suspension
applicants must establish that they have been physically present in the United States
for at least three years. Id. For others seeking suspension of deportation, the physical
presence requirement is seven years (INA §244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1254 (a)(1)) or, if the
applicant is deportable for certain criminal convictions, the presence requirement
climbs to ten years (INA §244(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §1254(a)(2)). As discussed supra note
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Applicants must establish elements similar to those of the self-petition,
plus additional evidence of at least three years physical presence in the
United States.75 VAWA also includes a flexible evidentiary standard for
battered women, and mandates that the INS consider "any credible evi-
dence" submitted by the VAWA applicant. 76 Accordingly, all forms of
credible evidence submitted by the applicant in support of self-petitions
and suspension of deportation must be considered.7 7
Enthusiasm for VAWA was tempered by the requirement that appli-
cants must meet eligibility standards beyond those required of family-
based visa applicants. 78 Congress imposed on VAWA applicants for self-
petitions and suspension of deportation the additional task of demon-
strating to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that deportation will
2, Congress amended the statute in 1996, and suspension of deportation became
unavailable to those placed in proceedings after April 1, 1997. Thereafter,
deportation proceedings became known as "removal proceedings" and the relief
became "cancellation of removal" under INA §240A(b). See INA 240 (b)(1), 8 U.S.C.
1129 b(b)(1). Under cancellation of removal, aliens who are not victims of domestic
violence must demonstrate ten years of physical presence and exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship. INA §240A(b)(1). INA §240A(b)(2) replaces INA
§244(a)(3) for battered spouses and children and the relief remains largely intact.
Suspension (or cancellation) is only available to one in a deportation (or removal)
proceeding. An application is presented to the Immigration Judge and a decision is
rendered following a hearing to determine the applicant's eligibility and whether as a
matter of discretion the relief should be granted. See Pendleton, Immigration Relief
for Women and Children Suffering Abuse, supra note 14, at 89.
15 See id. There are some important distinctions between a VAWA self-petition
and VAWA deportation/removal relief. When applying for suspension/cancellation,
the VAWA applicant may be divorced from her abuser. See INA §244(a)(3);
§240A(b)(2). Furthermore, she is not required to prove a "good faith marriage." Id.
However, evidence of marriage fraud may result in a finding that the applicant is not
a person of good moral character or a finding that she does not merit discretionary
relief. See Pendleton, Immigration Relief for Women and Children Suffering Abuse,
supra note 14, at 87.
76 See INA §204(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C. §1154(a)(1)(H) (with regard to self-petitions);
§244(g), 8 U.S.C. §1254(g) (regarding suspension of deportation applications), now
also at INA §240A(b)(2). This provision was passed in response to the INS's handling
of domestic violence cases of the alien spouses admitted to the United States on a
conditional basis. See Franco, supra note 11, at 120. The restrictive guidelines and
high standards of proof used by the INS in considering which evidence the agency
would consider in its review of battered spouse waivers for conditional residents,
generated widespread criticism. See Anderson, supra note 46, at 1417-1418.
17 The statute provides though that "[t]he determination of what evidence is and
the weight to be given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Attorney
General." INA §204(a)(1)(H); INA §244(g); INA §240A(b)(2).
78 See Lee Teran and Barbara Hines, Suspension of Deportation as Relief for
Battered Immigrant Women and Children, IMMIGRATION NEWSLETTER, Vol. 23, No. 1
(July 1995); Calvo, Domestic Policy, supra note 11.
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result in "extreme hardship" to the applicant or to her parent or child. 9
The Congressional record is silent as to the rationale for inserting
extreme hardship findings in the final version of the VAWA remedies.
80
VAWA would have provided welcome relief to undocumented battered
spouse and children if not for the impediments placed in its final
provisions.8 1
7 The hardship standard appears as a requirement for self-petitions under INA
§§204(a)(1)(A)(ii), B(ii)(iii), for suspension of deportation under §244(a)(3), and for
cancellation of removal under §240A(b)(3). See INA §240 (a)(1) (A)(ii), B(ii)(iii), 8
U.S.C. §1154 (a)(1)(B)(iii); INA §244 (a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1254 (a)(3); INA §240 A
(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1229b (b)(3). There is a slight, although possibly significant,
difference between the language of requirement in §244(a)(3) and that in §240A(b)(2)
and §204(a)(1). Under INA §244(a)(3), a VAWA applicant must show that she "is a
person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in
extreme hardship to [her] or to [her] parent or child." INA §244 (a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1254
(a)(3). The hardship requirement for cancellation of removal deletes the term "in the
opinion of the Attorney General." Compare INA §244(a)(3) (VAWA suspension)
with INA §240A(b)(2) (VAWA cancellation). See infra Section IV, 1 for discussion
on how the absence of the words may affect judicial review of extreme hardship
determinations.
80 The extreme hardship eligibility standard did not appear in early drafts of the
legislation. See Kelly, Stories From the Front, supra note 11, at 704. The final version
of the immigration provision was developed during the House and Senate conference
committee. There, Senator Simpson proposed inclusion of the extreme hardship and
good moral character criteria to stem concerns of fraud and unfounded applications
for immigration benefits. See Interview with Kathleen Sullivan, former counsel to the
Senate Immigration Subcomm., Aug. 20, 1998 (notes on file with the author).
81 Unquestionably, Congress has the power to set the quota and standards for
admission of non-citizens to the United States. See Chae Chin Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S.
581 (1889); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). The plenary power doctrine arose from
the principle that immigration matters rest within the confines of the nation's
legislation and executive authority. The doctrine has prompted a number of
authoritative articles, among them: Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectics, 66 HAgv. L. REv.
1362 (1953); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. Rv. 255; Peter Schuck, The Transformation of
Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1984); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARv.
L. Rnv. 853 (1987); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALF L.J. 545
(1990).
The plenary power doctrine is based on the federal government's power over
foreign policy. See also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). However,
VAWA was passed not as a foreign policy measure, but to meet domestic objectives to
respond to the problem of family violence in the United States. Calvo, Domestic
Policy, supra note 11, at 1. Given the unchecked power Congress has to determine
the fate of non-citizens, one would expect that Congress would give careful, reasoned
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The extreme hardship requirement, imposes a burden that detracts
from the overriding concern of VAWA to end domestic violence and
remove obstacles faced by its victims. Critics charge that the hardship
factor which is tied to immigration control, is inapplicable in the scheme
of family immigration.8 2 Moreover, women face the enormous and unset-
tling task of proving extreme hardship, a term which has had a narrow
and restrictive interpretation for the past twenty years.
8 3
In 1996, Congress focused again on immigration legislation, and bat-
tered spouses faced renewed threats to obtaining full and unencumbered
legal status. The 1996 Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (IIRAIRA)84 made critical changes to immigration law designed to
expedite the removal of deportable aliens and to limit their ability to
obtain discretionary relief from deportation. Applicants for admission to
the United States now face a three-year bar to entry if they have previ-
ously resided unlawfully in the United States for at least six months.8 5
The bar to admission climbs to ten years for those seeking entry following
unlawful presence of one year or more.88 After April 1, 1997, deporta-
tion and exclusion proceedings collapsed into new removal proceedings, 7
and common forms of relief from deportation such as suspension of
deportation were replaced with new relief called "cancellation of
removal. 88 IIRAIRA significantly restricts the availability of relief to
undocumented aliens by increasing the physical presence requirement
consideration to the statutory provisions it passes, particularly those that do not relate
to foreign policy concerns but are passed to ameliorate domestic problems.
82 See discussion infra Section II, C.
83 See discussion infra Section II.
84 See IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, implemented Sept. 30, 1996.
85 See IIRAIRA §301(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1182 (a)(9)(B)(i)(I), IN A
§212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I).
86 See IIRAIRA §301(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1182 (a)(9)(B)(i)(I), IN A
§212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
87 Compare former INA §§236 (exclusion proceedings) and 242 (deportation
proceedings) and new INA §240 (removal proceedings).
88 See INA §240A (a) and (b), 8 U.S.C. §1229b (a) and (b). Individuals who have
been lawfully present at least seven years, five of which were as legal residents, and
who are not aggravated felons may have removal proceedings canceled (§240A(a)).
Undocumented individuals may apply for relief under INA §240A(b) if they have
been continuously present for at least ten years, are persons of good moral character,
and can demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The previous
statute required seven years presence and extreme hardship. See INA §244(a)(1), 8
U.S.C. §1254 (a)(1). See supra note 2. IIRAIRA also provided that the applicant
must acquire the required physical presence prior to the institution of removal
proceedings and that any departure exceeding ninety days or an aggregate of one
hundred and eighty days would break presence for purposes of relief. See IIRAIRA
§304; INA §240A(d). IIRAIRA also limited the number of individuals who could be
granted cancellation relief under §240A(b) to 4,000 people. See IIRAIRA §304, 8
U.S.C. §1229b (d) and (e), INA §240A (d) and (e).
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from seven years to ten years and level of hardship requirement from
extreme hardship to exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. 9
However, for the most part, Congress retained the VAWA provisions
by exempting battered women and children from some of IIRAIRA's
harsh restrictions imposed on unlawfully present aliens, and creating new
protections for immigrant victims of violence. Battered women and chil-
dren may still self-petition, and retain relief from deportation under the
new cancellation of removal.9" New charges of inadmissibility, based on
unlawful presence in the United States, are waived in the cases of benefi-
ciaries of VAWA.91 Moreover, to further aid immigrant victims of domes-
tic violence, IIRAIRA prohibits INS officers from making adverse
determinations based solely on information gained from the abuser and
prohibits the unauthorized release of information about battered women
and children.
92
Despite dramatic setbacks in immigration law in 1996, efforts to
address the needs of battered immigrants have continued on the legisla-
tive front. Advocates have renewed legislative efforts to expand protec-
tions for battered immigrants, including proposals to eliminate extreme
hardship as an eligibility standard for VAWA self-petitions.9"
89 INA §240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(1). See Curtis Pierce, The Benefits of
"Hardship": Historical Analysis and Current Standards for Avoiding Removal, 76
INTERPRETER RELEASES 405, 408-11 (Mar. 15, 1999).
90 INA §240A(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2). The statute has the same requirement
for physical presence (3 years), hardship (extreme), and good moral character, as did
the previous statute. However, battered spouses applying for §240A(b)(2) relief are
restricted by the 4,000 person cap on adjustments to legal status. See INA §240A(c),
8 U.S.C. 1229b(c). In 1997, Congress made one change to §240A(c) in the Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). Battered spouses and
children granted suspension of deportation under INA §244(a)(3) are now exempted
from the 4,000 person cap. See NACARA §201.
91 See INA §212(a)(9)(B)(iv) exempts battered spouses but requires that the
applicant demonstrate a "substantial connection" between the unlawful entry or
overstay and the domestic violence. Battered spouses who entered the United States
prior to April 1, 1997, IIRAIRA's effective date, need not meet the "substantial
connection" test. See Gilbert, supra note 72, at 10-11.
92 See IIRAIRA §384, 8 U.S.C. § 1367.
93 On July 22, 1997, a coalition of advocates for battered immigrant women, the
National Network for Battered Immigrants, drafted a series of proposals to deal with
shortcoming in the immigration provisions for battered immigrant spouses and
children. See Network Proposal on file with author (recognizing the burdens that
VAWA applicants face, the proposal calls for Congress to amend VAWA by deleting
"extreme hardship" as a factor for self-petitions and removal relief). On January 19,
1999, portions of the Network's proposal were introduced to Congress as the Violence
Against Women Act II (H.R. 257) and the Violence Against Women Act of 1999 (S.
51) (on file with the author). See summary at 76 ITERPRETER RELEASES 371 (Mar.
8, 1999). Included is a proposal to delete the "extreme hardship" requirement from
VAWA self-petitions. Additionally, the bills would, if passed, restore INA §245(i) for
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Congress should heed this call to discard extreme hardship determina-
tions in VAWA cases.94 Extreme hardship is an undefined eligibility stan-
dard that is prone to varying interpretations and is inconsistent with any
relief designed to aid victims of domestic violence. The following section
also addresses the administrative responses to the statutory requirement
for extreme hardship determinations. The agency has made some effort
toward ameliorating the severity of the hardship requirement, but
problems will persist unless firmer steps are taken.
C. Extreme Hardship and Battered Spouses
Codified in many parts of the INA, "extreme hardship" is a require-
ment most often applied to those individuals who seek to immigrate but
who do not qualify under the traditional visa allocation system in which
applicants apply for family or employment-based visas.9" The law imposes
strict eligibility standards such as extreme hardship to those forms of
immigration relief that bypass the conventional immigrant visa scheme.96
battered spouse and children, see supra note 73, and remove barriers to suspension/
cancellation for VAWA applicants who have not accumulated three years of presence
before the institution of deportation/removal proceedings. See supra note 74. Any
immigration-related bill faces a Congress which favors tight immigration controls, and
which has for the past decade focused on the expulsion of deportable and
inadmissable non-citizens. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988; IMMACT: AEDPA;
IIRAIRA. On the other hand, in the midst of the restrictions on non-citizens,
Congress has exempted battered spouses and children from the harshest provisions of
the new legislation, and expanded their access to benefits. See IIRAIRA §309
(battered spouses and children not subject to 212(a)(6) grounds of inadmissibility and
212(a)(9) bars to reentry) and the NACARA (exempting battered spouses and
children from the 4,000 person cap on grants to suspension of deportation).
Moreover, the INS is reported to favor deletion of the "extreme hardship"
requirement for self-petitions. Interview with Gail Pendleton, Immigration Project of
the National Lawyers Guild (June 28, 1999).
14 See Kelly, Stories From the Front, supra note 11, at 704 (arguing that both the
extreme hardship and good moral character requirements should be repealed by
Congress.)
91 See supra, note 56.
96 See infra, note 97. Two notable exceptions are present. Under INA
§201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. §1151(b)(2)(A)(i), widows and widowers of United States
citizens may apply for immigrant visas despite the death of a U.S. citizen petitioning
spouse following two years of marriage and with evidence of a good faith marriage.
Furthermore, at INA §101(a)(27)(J), the statute permits abandoned and abused
children to immigrate upon the finding by a juvenile court that it would not serve the
child's best interests to be returned to the country of origin. There is no requirement
to demonstrate extreme hardship in either the case of the widow/widower or the
special immigrant juvenile.
The imposition of a hardship requirement, which is reasonable for purposes of
some benefits, is out of place in the scheme of family immigration. See Calvo, Spouse-
Based Immigration Laws, supra note 57, at 636; Calvo, Domestic Policy, supra note
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Consequently, deportable non-citizens ineligible for an immigrant visa
must meet this standard when applying to suspend deportation, and can-
cellation of removal.97
Battered spouses of permanent residents and United States citizens do
not fit within the category of foreign nationals for whom extreme hard-
ship is an appropriate eligibility standard. The addition of extreme hard-
ship as a requirement for battered women to obtaining legal residence is
a burden that unnecessarily distinguishes victims of domestic violence
from other foreign national spouses eligible to immigrate. The visa peti-
tion filed by a legal resident or U.S. citizen for his foreign national spouse
must be accompanied by evidence of the petitioner's legal status and a
lawful marriage between the parties.98 No evidence of any hardship,
extreme or otherwise, is required. Additionally, the conditional resident
spouse who has been battered is not burdened with proving extreme
hardship when she seeks to remove the condition. Yet, the only differ-
ence between the battered undocumented applicant for VAWA benefits
and the battered conditional resident is that the conditional resident's
abusing spouse initiated the immigration process by filing and completing
an immigrant visa. There is no justification for impeding an undocu-
11. See also Thcker, Assimilation to the United States, supra note 61, at 26 (some
immigration policies devalue the principle of family unity). Once the status of the
U.S. citizen or legal resident petition and the relationship to the beneficiary is
established in a visa application, the non-citizen beneficiary may apply for permanent
resident status, and must demonstrate only that s/he is not inadmissible under the
grounds laid out in INA §212. GoRDAN, MAImAM & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 8, at
§50.02(1).
97 Applicants for suspension of deportation under INA §244(a)(1) (and
cancellation of removal under INA §240A(b)(1)) are typically individuals who have
entered the United States illegally or have violated a lawful entry, and have remained
undetected in the country for enough time to qualify for the relief. Concerns about
rewarding non-citizens who are unlawfully present and who are ineligible to
immigrate based on a family or employment-based visa have prompted Congress to
impose hardship standards. See infra Section III and accompanying discussion.
Another class of non-citizens required to demonstrate "extreme hardship" to gain
resident status are those who meet the eligibility criteria for a family- or employment-
based visa, but are inadmissible due to criminal or other misconduct. A general visa
applicant is required to demonstrate "extreme hardship" if the applicant is
inadmissable under INA §212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (admission or conviction of a crime of
moral turpitude), §212(a)(2)(D) (acts of prostitution), §212(a)(6)(C) (fraud or
misrepresentation), and the applicant is seeking a waiver of the ground of
inadmissability under INA §212(h) or §212(i). The waiver requires that the applicant
demonstrate "extreme hardship" to specified family members. Thus, only when the
beneficiary has engaged in criminal behavior, prostitution, fraud, or
misrepresentation is a finding of extreme hardship necessary to outweigh the negative
factors of inadmissibility.
98 See GORDON, MAILMAN § YALE-LOEHR, supra note 8, at §41.01(2)(a).
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mented battered spouse's access to legal status simply because her abuser
never initiated an immigrant visa petition.99
"Extreme hardship" is consistent with enforcement goals set by Con-
gress to limit access to immigration benefits, and thus has long been con-
sidered a significant obstacle to attaining relief from expulsion and
ultimately immigrant status. One commentator noted that proving
extreme hardship presents an "insurmountable burden."'0 0 In line with
Congress's intent to limit the availability of discretionary relief to only a
deserving few, courts typically construe extreme hardship quite nar-
rowly. 01 Unquestionably, the recent trend in Congress has been to deal
severely with illegal immigration, and to impose strict eligibility standards
to immigration benefits available to undocumented individuals.
Attached to both forms of VAWA relief, however, extreme hardship is
an artificial barrier. Battered spouses are members of a class of individu-
als already eligible to immigrate and it is not likely that undocumented
women will purposely become domestic violence victims in order to gain
99 See Franco, supra note 11, at 122. See also Calvo, Domestic Policy, supra note
11, at 29-31. Professor Calvo surmises that one reason some members of Congress
were willing to encumber the immigration provisions of VAWA with an extreme
hardship standard was that they consider families plagued by violence to be unworthy
of an immigration benefit. The willingness of Congress to impose the burden of
proving hardship conflicts with its objective to stop domestic violence and to prevent
immigration law from further use as a tool of the abuser. See id. The law thereby
serves only those immigrants suffering abuse who can demonstrate extreme hardship,
and ignore other immigrants who may be victims of serious abuse.
100 Jonathon Foerstal, Suspension of Deportation: Towards a New Hardship
Standard, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 663 (1981). Consideration of extreme hardship
should entail a balancing of the agency's enforcement goals and the ameliorative
nature of the relief. See William Underwood, Unreviewable Discretionary Justice: The
New Extreme Hardship in Cancellation of Deportation Cases, 72 IND. L.J. 885, 886
(1997). Whether or not INS enforcement goals are balanced equally with the humane
concerns for non-citizens, the extreme hardship standard still remains inappropriate
as a standard attached to a statute which has nothing to do with stemming the tide of
illegal immigration.
1o' See generally INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984), citing S. REP. No. 82-
1137, pt. 1, 25 (1952):
[Congress] made the criteria for suspension of deportation more stringent both to
restrict the opportunity for discretionary action ... and to exclude: 'aliens [who] are
deliberately flouting our immigration laws by the processes of gaining admission into
the United States illegally or ostensibly as nonimmigrants but with the intention of
establishing themselves in a situation in which they may subsequently have access to
some administrative remedy to adjust their status to that of permanent residents.'
Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 562 ( 51h Cir. 1987) (Case concerns
Mexican couple with four U.S. citizen children denied suspension; court sided with
congressional intent was to restrict, not increase, the number of aliens eligible).
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legal status in the United States." 2 VAWA is meant to provide meaning-
ful relief to battered spouses who are eligible to immigrate and are
already in the United States. The statute is not concerned with nor does it
foster illegal immigration.
"Extreme hardship" is an inappropriate standard for battered immi-
grant spouses because Congress and the courts have never defined the
term;0 3 a determination in any given case is unpredictable. 4 Determi-
nations of "extreme hardship" have been based traditionally on review of
a number of elements known as the Anderson factors. 0 5 These factors
include the applicant's age and health, length of residence, family and
community ties in the United States, immigration history, other means to
adjust status, and to a limited extent, the economic, social, and political
conditions of the applicant's native country.' 0 6 VAWA requires the
agency to examine all relevant factors when considering any VAWA
application.0 7 Furthermore, the agency has promulgated interim rules
that instruct adjudicators of VAWA self-petitions to consider factors rela-
tive to the abuse suffered by the applicant. The factors include: the
nature and extent of the abuse, the legal and social protection available to
the applicant in the United States, and the unavailability of similar pro-
tection and services abroad.i°8 However, Congress and the courts give
the agency wide latitude in the ultimate determination of a given extreme
102 See Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 11, at 321. Nor is it likely
that women would succeed in fraudulently obtaining legal status based on false
evidence of battery or extreme cruelty. Congress raised concerns regarding fraud
when it included "extreme hardship" as a standard of eligibility. See Anderson, supra
note 46, at 1426. Fraud can be dealt with through evidentiary guidelines for proving
battery and extreme cruelty and determining good faith marriage, not by adding an
additional eligibility standard unrelated to the perceived problem. It is unfair to
burden an undocumented battered spouse with proving "extreme hardship" in order
to gain an immigrant visa or relief from deportation. A strict immigration control
devise, which is appropriate for some immigration benefits provided to
undocumented non-citizens, is unnecessary for this population of otherwise eligible
immigrants and threaten to deprive immigrant victims with the status that will best
protect them from continuing violence and abuse. Inclusion of the hardship standard
labels battered spouses as unwelcome or unworthy immigrants.
103 See Matter of Hwang, 10 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 1964).
104 "Extreme hardship" is a nebulous term and the agency and courts have failed
to provide much interpretative guidance. See Susan L. Kamlet, Judicial Review of
"Extreme Hardship" in Suspension of Deportation Cases, 34 AM. U. L. Rnv. 175, 177
(1984). In fact, litigation surrounding determinations of the issue of extreme hardship
has generated a wide range of disparate and even inconsistent decisions. Id. at 105.
105 See Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596.
106 See id. at 597.
107 See INA §§204(a)(1)(H); 244(g); 240A(b)(2).
108 See 61 Fed. Reg. 13061-13079; Leslye Orloff et al., No Place to Turn: Improving
Legal Advocacy for Battered Immigrant Women, 29 FAm. L.Q. 313, 327 (1995);
Lilienthal, supra note 11.
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hardship claim. Consequently, similarly situated battered spouses receive
disparate treatment depending on the location where they live or the
adjudicators assigned to their cases.' 0 9 The agency has not distanced
itself from the historical and traditional interpretations of extreme hard-
ship. Anderson and its progeny, which preceded VAWA and do not
address extreme hardship as it relates to domestic violence, interpret the
term with particular emphasis on the need to demonstrate lengthy resi-
dence and strong family and community ties in the United States. These
are factors that many domestic violence victims are unable to meet."0
Additionally, Anderson and other cases have found that the economic
and political conditions an alien will face abroad should generally not be
a determinative factor in assessing extreme hardship when most undocu-
mented aliens come to the United States from countries which are not as
economically and politically advanced."' In applying the Anderson fac-
tors, adjudicators may be prompted to deny relief to battered women
who are otherwise eligible to immigrate but who fail to meet a traditional
profile precisely because they are domestic violence victims."
2
109 Agencies often have difficulty providing consistent interpretations of law,
particularly when the governing statutes are vague. As Professor Heyman notes,
agencies engage in "a kind of best guess" when interpreting statutory terms. See
Michael G. Heyman, Judicial Review of Discretionary Immigration Decisionmaking,
31 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 861, 866 (1994). Furthermore, a statutory term will likely be
subject to a variety of interpretations when within a large agency there is a mix of
"hardnosed types showing greater conservatism than their more permissive
counterparts." Id. at 888.
110 See Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws, supra note 57, at 636. See also
cases cited infra notes 162, 163. The reliance on Anderson and the emphasis placed
on long residential ties to the United States in extreme hardship findings is
inappropriate in VAWA cases because Congress diminished the length of time that a
battered spouse would need to qualify for suspension or cancellation. Section
244(a)(1) relief is dependent on at least seven years physical presence. The presence
requirement climbs to ten in §240A(b)(1) cases. VAWA applicants need only prove
presence of three years for purposes of relief under INA §244(a)(3); §240A(b)(2), and
there is no term of physical presence required before filing a VAWA self-petition
under INA §204(a)(1)(A)(iii) and §204(a)(1)(B)(ii).
"I See Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596, 598 (BIA 1978). See also Kamlet,
supra note 104, at n. 38.
112 Similar concerns are raised by the good moral character requirement, also an
element that is not required of other visa applicants. See Kelly, supra note 11, at 686-
687; Cecelia Espenoza, No Relief for the Weary: VAWA Relief Denied for Battered
Immigrants Lost in the Intersections, manuscript on file with the author. The addition
of the standard will undoubtedly lead to denials of VAWA applications in cases in
which the conduct is tied to the abuse. For instance, a woman who defends herself
against her abusive husband's attacks and is charged and convicted of assault may be
ineligible for VAWA under the terms of the statute. INA §101(f), 8 U.S.C.A. 1101
(1996). A woman who stood by as her child is battered also may be held ineligible as
being a person of bad moral character.
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Congress's ill-conceived decision to include extreme hardship as an eli-
gibility criterion sends the wrong message to the immigrant community.
Difficulty in obtaining legal status hinders battered immigrant women
seeking to leave an abusive situation. Absent Congressional action to
remove the hardship factor, the success of immigration cases brought
under VAWA depends on the willingness of the Department of Justice to
depart from traditional concepts in the determination of extreme hard-
ship. Absent a new construction of extreme hardship in VAWA cases,
insurmountable barriers to attaining legal status will defeat the ameliora-
tive purposes of the new legislation.
HI. Tim STRUGGLE TO D-FiNE ExTm E HARDSHnp
The term "extreme hardship" first appeared in the early development
of relief for deportable aliens, and it reappears from time to time when
Congress considers extending or restricting immigration benefits.
Because Congress has never defined extreme hardship, "not a definable
term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,""' 3 the task of interpret-
ing the eligibility standard has been assigned to the agency which is given
wide latitude to assess the "facts and circumstances of each case."" 4 In
Matter of Anderson, the Board, drawing from comments by a House Judi-
ciary Report," 5 outlined the factors considered relevant to the determi-
nation of extreme hardship: family ties in the United States and abroad,
length of residence in the United States, health of the applicant, eco-
Both the extreme hardship and good moral character standards contribute to the
notion that battered women are less desirable as immigrants, and to the stereotype
that battered women are somehow at fault for the abuse. The standards are not
consistent with the goal of Congress to support battered women. Calvo, Domestic
Policy, supra note 11, at 8.
13. Matter of Hwang, 10 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 1964).
114 Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 882 (1994).
15 In 1975, the House Judiciary Committee met to consider adding an unusual
hardship standard to the statute authorizing adjustment of status, and in the process
discussed the factors which the Committee believed should be considered in extreme
hardship determinations. See H.R. REP. No. 94-506 at 17 (1975). The Board of
Immigration Appeals in Matter of S, 5 I&N Dec. 409 (1953) had set forth the
following factors considered relevant for determining the then hardship standard,
exceptional and extremely unusual: 1) length of the non-citizen's residence, 2) family
ties in the United States and abroad, 3) possibilities for obtaining a visa abroad, 4)
financial difficulties in traveling abroad to obtain a visa, 5) the applicant's health and
age. See id. at 410-11. The 1975 House Report suggested consideration of additional
factors: 1) economic and political conditions in the country to which the non-citizen
would be deported, 2) the applicant's business and occupation, 3) other means
available to immigrate, 4) any special assistance the applicant offered to the
community or the United States, 5) his or her immigration history, and 6) ties to the
community. See Sana Loue, What Went Wrong with Wang?: An Examination of
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Wang, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 59, 61 (1982).
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nomic and political conditions of the applicant's native country, financial
status, the possibility of other means of adjustment of status, community
service, immigration history, and position in the community." 6 However,
the agency has traditionally adopted a narrow construction of the term,
one favoring the government. Courts have struggled over the "extreme
hardship" determination, but following the Supreme Court's decision in
INS v. Wang" 7 courts increasingly opted to defer to agency interpreta-
tions of the standard."
8
Battered immigrant women are threatened by the traditional agency
construction of extreme hardship and by the reluctance of federal courts
to intervene in agency determinations. The agency has taken some posi-
tive steps, such as promulgating rules and policy statements sensitive to
the concerns of battered spouses. However, extreme hardship in VAWA
cases is still determined on a case by case basis with no guarantee that
adjudicators will give adequate consideration to factors favoring victims
of domestic violence.
A. History
Prior to 1940, immigration law provided no relief to deportable
aliens." 9 In the Alien Registration Act of 1940, Congress incorporated a
provision for the suspension of deportation and adjustment to legal status
for those non-citizens who could demonstrate the following: five years
residence, good moral character, and serious economic detriment to the
applicant's spouse, parent, or child who was a United States citizen or
lawful permanent resident. 20 In 1948, the Act was amended to permit
non-citizens with seven years residence and good moral character to qual-
ify, regardless of the presence of family in the United States.121 In 1952,
Congress revised suspension of deportation in response to heavy criticism
that the economic detriment standard was too lenient and gave unfair
116 See Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. at 597. See also Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 409
(1953).
117 See supra note 4.
118 Reviewing courts either deferred to the government's narrow view of extreme
hardship or had difficulty in reviewing a multi-factor determination. One court found
extreme hardship to be a "highly subjective standard that is difficult, if not impossible,
to review." Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d 558 (5t" Cir. 1987).
119 Only by a private bill addressed to Congress could a foreign national obtain
relief from deportation. See INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 140 (1981) (citing Foti v. INS,
375 U.S. 217, 222 (1963)).
120 See Alien Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 672 (amending §19 of the 1917
Immigration Act). The history of the suspension of deportation is also discussed in
Kamlet, supra note 104; Foerstal, supra note 100; Underwood, supra note 100; Curtis
Pierce, The Benefits of "Hardship": Historical Analysis and Current Standards for
Avoiding Removal, INTERPRETER RELEASES, Vol. 76, No. 10 at 406-407 (Mar. 15,
1999).
121 See Act of July 1, 1948, 62 Stat. 1206.
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advantage to foreign nationals who violated immigration laws over those
waiting to immigrate legally. 2 2 The new statute required that the suspen-
sion applicant demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
to designated family members.1
23
Later, the statute came under attack for setting too harsh a standard.
124
In the 1962 Act, extreme hardship became the standard for determination
in suspension cases.' 25 The 1962 Act required that aliens seeking suspen-
sion of deportation demonstrate "in the opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral" that deportation would cause extreme hardship to the applicant
and/or to the applicant's spouse, parent, or child who is a United States
citizen or lawful permanent resident. 26 The statute further required that
applicants prove a physical presence of seven years and good moral char-
acter during the entire term of physical presence, and demonstrate that
she merits favorable exercise of discretion.'2 7 Suspension of deportation
remained substantially intact until the recent passage of the IIRAIRA,
12
which repealed suspension relief under INA §244, renamed the relief
"cancellation of removal," and retreated to the pre-1962 standard of
requiring exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. 29
"Extreme hardship" appears in other immigration statutes. In 1957,
Congress authorized the Attorney General to waive exclusion for foreign
nationals eligible to immigrate, but inadmissible on criminal or prostitu-
tion grounds. 30 To qualify for a waiver of inadmissibility, visa applicants
122 See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984). See also Foerstel, supra note 100,
at 667-68; Underwood, supra note 100, at 889.
123 See The Immigration Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952).
124 See S. REP. No. 82-1137 (1952); S. REP. No. 81-1515 at 600-61 (1950). See also
Foerstel, supra note 100, at 666.
125 See Act of October 24,1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, 94, 76 Stat. 1247, 1248 (1962).
126 The higher hardship standard in the 1952 Act was retained in the 1962 Act for
those with serious violations and deportable under §241(a)(2), (3), and (4), 8 U.S.C.
1251 (a)(2)(3) and (4). Applicants were required to demonstrate ten years of physical
presence, good moral character, and exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.
Act of October 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, 76 Stat. 1247 (1962).
127 See INA §244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1254 (a)(1).
128 See supra note 2.
129 HRAIRA is a major overhaul of immigration law. Title III, Subtitle A, Section
304, reconfigures deportation and exclusion proceedings which after April 1, 1997
become "removal proceedings." "Cancellation of removal" replaces suspension of
deportation and requires that applicant demonstrate ten years of residence, good
moral character, and the heightened hardship standard. INA §240(A)(b)(1).
130 See Act of September 11, 1957, PuB. L. 85-316, §5, 71 Stat. 639. Codified at
INA §212(h), 8 U.S.C. §1182 (h) (B) (1996) provides relief to foreign nationals who
were inadmissable due to the commission of certain crimes but who could
demonstrate that selected family members would suffer extreme hardship. The
statute was amended in the Immigration Act of 1990, which provided that the waiver
would apply to conduct that occurred more than 15 years prior to the application.
Through a drafting error the extreme hardship waiver was eliminated. The
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are required to demonstrate that their deportation will result in extreme
hardship to a spouse, parent, or child who is a United States citizen or
lawful permanent resident.
131
Extreme hardship is an eligibility standard under which conditional res-
idents may obtain permanent residence in accordance with the IMFA. 32
In the 1986 legislation, Congress provided two waivers of the requirement
that the conditional resident and spouse file at the end of the two years a
joint petition to remove the condition. The first waiver was centered on a
showing of extreme hardship based on circumstances arsing since the
acquisition of conditional immigrant status.'33 The second required evi-
dence that the marriage had been entered in good faith, the alien spouse
had terminated the marriage for good cause, and the alien was not at
fault for meeting the requirement of a joint petition.
34
More recently in IIRAIRA, Congress attached extreme hardship as a
qualifying factor to waivers for fraud and misrepresentation under INA
§212(i).135 Until Congress amended the statute in 1996 to require a find-
ing of extreme hardship to the spouse or parent of the applicant, the
§212(i) waiver required only the exercise of discretion. IIRAIRA also
mandates a finding of extreme hardship to waive a new ground of inad-
missibility under INA §212(a)(9) for those aliens seeking admission to the
United States following an illegal presence in the United States of at least
six months.'
36
1. A Narrow Restrictive Interpretation
Extreme hardship determinations generated considerable litigation fol-
lowing the decision in Foti v. INS.' In Foti, the Supreme Court held that
suspension of deportation cases were subject to review in the Circuit
Court of Appeals incident to an appeal of a final order of deportation.
Review has most often centered on the definition of extreme hardship
and the respective roles played by the Attorney General and the review-
MISCELLANEOUS AND TECHNICAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
AMENDMENTS OF 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, §307(8), 105 Stat. 1733, 1755 (1991)
restored the extreme hardship waiver regardless of the date of commission of the
offense. Recently in the IIRAIRA, §212(h) was amended to preclude relief to
permanent residents who are aggravated felons and to those immigrants with less
than seven years lawful residence.
131 See INA §212(h), 8 U.S.C. §1182(h) (1996).
132 See supra discussion at Section II, A, 1.
133 See INA §216(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. §1186 (c)(4)(A) (1996).
134 See INA §216(c)(4)(B) (1989), 8 U.S.C. §1186(c)(4)(B) (1996).
135 See INA §212(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182 (1996).
136 INA §212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (1996).
137 Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963).
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ing federal courts in extreme hardship determinations."' The Foti Court
did not rule on the scope of judicial review of extreme hardship and post-
Foti the litigation has produced a variety of divergent decisions.'" 9 In
some cases in which courts were asked to review the denial of a claim to
extreme hardship by the Board, courts have rejected the Board's restric-
tive, conservative view of the meaning and application of extreme hard-
ship and favored an approach consistent with the humanitarian purposes
of the statute. Other courts have refused to interfere with the Board's
determination of extreme hardship, citing the Attorney General's broad
authority in the area of immigration.
In Wang v. INS, 4° a Korean couple who overstayed their visas and
were ordered deported, moved to reopen deportation proceedings after
they had accumulated over seven years physical presence in the United
States. Mr. and Mrs. Wang argued that their deportation would cause an
extreme hardship to their two U.S. citizen children. The Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that the law did not provide relief to all aliens who met the
good moral character and physical presence requirements, but found that
"the statute should be liberally construed to effectuate its ameliorative
purpose,.., so that suspension of deportation will be granted to the alien
for whom the hardship from deportation would be different and more
severe than that suffered by the ordinary alien who is deported."' 41
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit's
rejection of the Board's extreme hardship determination.14 The Court
138 See, e.g., Ravancho v. INS, 658 F.2d 169, 174-75 (3d Cir. 1981) (deciding that
the Attorney General should interpret the statutory provision in light of the
humanitarian motives which impelled Congress to enact it.)
139 See Kamlet, supra note 104, at 184-186, for a review of the tension between
competing notions of appellate court review of agency determinations of extreme
hardship. Some courts considered extreme hardship to involve a statutory
interpretation that permitted federal court intervention. Findings of fact made in the
determination narrowed the review, but if the interpretation is both law and fact,
courts could step in even if there was substantial evidence to support the lower court
finding. Finally, many courts have decided that the determination of hardship rests
under the Attorney General's discretion and judicial review was limited to only an
abuse of discretion.
140 622 F.2d 1341 (9h Cir. 1980) (en banc), rev'd, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per curiam).
141 Id. at 1346 (citing Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 817 (9t' Cir. 1964)).
142 See INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. at 139, 142-43. In this instance, the first issue before
the Court was not whether the Ninth Circuit's review of the Board's extreme hardship
decision was correct, but whether the Ninth Circuit should have reopened the
deportation case. The Court decided that Mr. and Mrs. Wang had supported their
motion to reopen their deportation proceedings with conclusory statements and thus,
they had failed to meet the requirements of INS regulations governing motions to
reopen. See id. at 143. The Court then took aim at what it considered the "more
fundamental" question, the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the Board's review of extreme
hardship. See id. at 144.
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found that the lower court had interfered with the Attorney General's
authority.
[T]he Act commits their definition [of the words "extreme hard-
ship"] in the first instance to the Attorney General and his delegates,
and their construction and application of this standard should not be
overturned by a reviewing court simply because it may prefer
another interpretation of the statute.
143
As to the meaning of extreme hardship, the Court found this "a crucial
question in this case," and although the words are "not self-explanatory,
and reasonable men could easily differ as to their construction" the inter-
pretation is left to the Attorney General.4 However, the Wang Court
did sanction a narrow definition of the term, one it found to be consistent
with the statute and with the "exceptional nature of the suspension rem-
edy"'145 to accord immigrant status outside the visa allocation scheme.
Wang was an admonishment to lower courts to refrain from interfering
with the Attorney General's authority to review substantively extreme
hardship, 146 but the Court did not outline boundaries for further federal
143 Id. at 144.
144 Id.
145 Id. Following Wang, the Supreme Court in INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183
(1984) reiterated that suspension of deportation is extraordinary relief. In its
interpretation of the "continuous physical presence" requirement, the Court stated,
"suspensions of deportation are 'grossly unfair to aliens who await abroad their turn
on quota waiting lists,' and Congress wanted to limit the number of aliens allowed to
... remain through discretionary action." Id. at 191 (citing H.R. REP. No. 82-1365
(1952)).
146 See Kamlet, supra note 104, at 176. See also Heyman, Judicial Review, supra
note 104, at 892. Professor Heyman attributes what he terms the "stunted judicial
review of immigration decisions" to three themes. See id. at 862-64. One is the
court's recognition of congressional power over immigration matters and reluctance
to interfere in legislation relating to the admission of non-citizens. The plenary power
doctrine, while technically a theory which insulates Congress from constitutional
challenge to immigration legislation, also "reflects a mood decidedly unfavorable to
aliens." Id. at 862. Secondly, the nature of immigration law is one in which non-
citizens who are unlawfully present seek to apply for relief as a matter of
administrative grace. Id. at 863. Finally, judicial restraint in immigration matters is
attributed to the deference courts are likely to show towards agency decisions. This
deference is exemplified in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resource Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). See id.
at 863-64. In Chevron, the court ruled that federal courts should generally defer to
agency interpretations of statutes that the agency administers and should reject an
interpretation only when contrary to Congressional intent. Following Chevron, the
court in Heckler held that when there is no meaningful standard upon which to
determine an agency's exercise of discretion, the decision is committed to the agency
and not the court. While Wang was decided prior to Chevron and Heckler, the case
was an omen of what was to come. Id. at 891 n. 146. See also Daniel Kanstroom,
Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration
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court review of extreme hardship determinations. Some courts, particu-
larly the Ninth Circuit, maintained a close watch on the Board, chiding
the agency for failing to consider all relevant factors, to assess the cumu-
lative effect of factors it did consider, and to provide a reasoned explana-
tion for the extreme hardship determination.147
In Prapavat v. INS, 48 decided in the wake of Wang, the Court of
Appeals refused to affirm the Board's extreme hardship finding because
it did not properly consider all relevant factors, individually and cumula-
tively. The court criticized the Board's conclusory assessments and super-
ficial treatment of evidence of hardship. 49 While most courts reviewed
the Board decisions for procedural errors, some have come very close to
a substantive review of the extreme hardship determinations. For
instance, in Gutierrez-Centeno v. INS,' 50 the Court of Appeals reversed
the Board's decision because it had failed to give "considerable, if not
predominant weight" to separation between the respondent and family
which would occur if Gutierrez was deported. 151
However, in another prominent series of cases, circuit courts refused to
overturn Board decisions absent a complete failure to consider relevant
factors.' 52 Federal court unwillingness to interfere with determinations
Law, 7 TUL. L. REv. 703, 734-35 (1997) (discussing the trend in judicial deference to
administrative decisions).
147 See Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419 (9' Cir. 1987); Jara-Navarette v. INS,
813 F.2d 1340 (91h Cir. 1986); Luna v. INS, 709 F.2d 126 (1St Cir. 1983). See also cases
cited by Kamlet, supra note 104, at 192. However, Stephen Feldman characterizes the
post-Wang Ninth Circuit cases as "uneven" on the issue of court deference to agency
determinations of extreme hardship. See Feldman, supra note 125, at 34-35.
148 662 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1981).
149 See id. at 562 ("the Board tacitly invoked a floodgates argument by simply
assuming that 'most deported aliens' would experience the same degree of hardship
as the Prapavats"). See also Ravancho v. INS, 658 F.2d 169, 176. The court stated:
We read the Supreme Court's Wang decision as reiterating the basic precept,
which our prior opinion had also referred to, that Congress entrusted to the
Attorney General, and not to the courts, discretion to determine whether a
petitioner has shown extreme hardship to warrant suspension of deportation.
While the scope of such review may be narrow, it extends at least to a
determination as to whether the procedure followed by the Board in a particular
case constitutes an improper exercise of that discretion.
150 99 F.3d 1529 (9-' Cir. 1996).
151 See id. at 1533. See also Salcido-Salcido v. INS, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9" Cir.
1998) ("[T]he BIA abused its discretion because it failed to consider the hardship to
Salcido and her U.S. children if they are separated because of Salcido's deportation to
Mexico."); Casem v. INS, 8 F.3d 700, 703 (9"h Cir. 1993) ("The inquiry into family ties
. . . must not be limited to noting the benefits of living near one's immediate or
extended family. The BIA also must examine the impact of 'untying' the family ties
Congress sought to safeguard.").
152 See Hernandez-Patino v. INS, 831 F.2d at 755; Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, 682
F.2d 143 (7" Cir. 1982). See also cases cited by Kamlet, supra note 104, at 197, n. 156.
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by the Attorney General of extreme hardship is illustrated in the Fifth
Circuit's case, Hernandez-Cordero v. INS.'53 The Board had affirmed the
immigration judge's finding of no extreme hardship in the case of a Mexi-
can couple, who were admittedly "industrious, law-abiding and the type
that anyone would desire as a next-door neighbor" and who had lived in
the United States for twelve years and had three United States citizen
children, aged eight to eleven. 54 The en banc court held that the Board
retained unfettered discretion to determine whether a suspension appli-
cant met the extreme hardship requirement and, ultimately, whether he
should be granted the relief, " 'a matter of grace,' similar to a presidential
pardon. 1 55 The court refused to consider the Hernandez-Cordero fam-
ily's claim, finding that Wang eliminates substantive review unless "the
hardship is uniquely extreme, at [,] or closely approaching [,] the outer
limits of the most severe hardship the alien could suffer and so severe that
any reasonable person would necessarily conclude that the hardship is
extreme.' 56 The court held that it could review the case for procedural
errors, but only if it was evident that the Board had utterly failed to con-
sider relevant extreme hardship factors.' 57 The Fifth Circuit also found
that it lacked authority to determine the weight that should be assigned
to the "extreme hardship" factors.' 58 The court approved the Board's
153 See supra note 101.
154 Id. at 567.
1- Id. at 561 (citing United States ex rel. Kalondis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489,
491 (2nd Cir. 1950)). The Fifth Circuit concluded that the extreme hardship
determination was to be treated in line with the ultimate decision to grant relief. See
Heyman, supra note 104, at 894. Professor Heyman is highly critical of the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Hernandez-Cordero and the Court's reliance on Jay v. Boyd, 351
U.S. 345 (1980), a case which defined the ultimate decision on whether to grant the
relief as unfettered. The court initially recognized the statute as two-tiered, divided
between statutory eligibility issues, including extreme hardship, and the decision
whether to grant or deny relief. In the end it found the hardship determination to be
of the same character as the final discretionary decision. The court relied on two
aspects of extreme hardship. First, it found express authority for the agency to
determine extreme hardship, parallel to the ultimate authority to grant or deny the
relief, in the statutory language, "in the opinion of the Attorney General" attached to
the eligibility standard, INA §244(a)(1). Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d 558, 562 (5"h
Cir. 1987). Secondly, the Court found the word "extreme" to be "a highly subjective
standard difficult, if not impossible, to review." Id.
The characterization of extreme hardship determinations as highly discretionary
has been resurrected in recent debates over the impact of Congress' new rules on
judicial review. See discussion infra at Section IV, B.
156 Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 563. The dissent is critical of the majority's
terminology, arguing that it more closely mirrored the "exceptional and extremely
unusual" standard and that Congress intended INA §244(a)(1) to be read with more
compassion. Id. at 565.
157 See id. at 563.
158 See id. (citing Sanchez v. INS, 755 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5h Cir. 1985)).
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construction of "extreme hardship." "Congress meant to narrow the
availability of the relief, not expand it." '159
Despite the Attorney General's discretion to determine extreme hard-
ship, she has failed to provide more than "limited guidance in terms of [a]
measurement" 16° of the factors to be considered. Only general observa-
tions based on review of the few decisions published by the Board can be
made.'61 Favorable extreme hardship determinations are more likely in
suspension cases in which the applicant has established physical presence
in the United States well beyond the statutory requirement, has signifi-
cant ties to immediate family in the United States, and can demonstrate
substantial involvement in the U.S. community.162 Separation from fam-
ily in the United States and the presence of a United States citizen child
of school age receives added weight, but a positive finding is less likely if
the children are very young.
1 63
159 Id. at 562 n.3. The court in Hernandez-Cordero appears to interpret Wang as
almost precluding review of extreme hardship. Feldman, supra note 125, at 34. Other
courts have also accepted the same narrow interpretation. See Najafi v. INS,104 F.3d
943 (7th Cir. 1997); Astrero v. INS, 104 F.3d 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
160 In Re O-J-0, Int. Dec. 3280 at 25 (BIA 1996) (Rosenberg, Board member,
concurring). Another Board Member comments that the Anderson factors do "little
in the way of providing content to the ambiguous phrase 'extreme hardship."' Id. at 37
(Flppu, Board Member, dissenting). However, extreme hardship gains some
measurement of a definition once compared to the stricter standard found in INA
§244(a)(2) and 240A(b)(1) of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.
Underwood, supra note 101. The adjectives "unique" and "unusual" are more
appropriately applied to the heightened standard. Id.
161 As of 1996, there were approximately 20 decisions published by the Board on
the rule of extreme hardship. See In Re O-J-O, Int. Dec. 3280 at 14 (Holmes, Board
member, concurring). There are also eight decisions relating to motions to reopen and
extreme hardship. Id.
162 See Matter of Loo, 15 I&N Dec. 601, 605 (BIA 1976) (25 years residence and
permanent resident daughter); Matter of McCarthy, 10 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 1963) (40
years residence in United States, lawful resident spouse and three United States
citizen children). In evaluating a case and the potential for a favorable extreme
hardship finding, practitioners more often rely on their own experience and that of
other practitioners in the field. Unpublished decisions of immigration judges and the
Board also provide a source for interpretation. See National Lawyers Guild,
Immigration Project, Supplement to Materials on Suspension of Deportation, texts of
unpublished BIA Decisions, June 11, 1986 (on file with the author).
163 Matter of Kim, 15 I&N Dec. 88 (BIA 1974) (hardship to 6-1/2 and 3 year old
United States citizen children not established). The Board has commented that a
suspension applicant can not "gain an immigration benefit merely because he has
fathered a child in this country." Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, 682 F.2d 143 (7t' Cir.
1982). See also Hernandez-Patino v. INS, 831 F.2d 750 (7t' Cir. 1987). On the other
hand, other exceptional factors, such as military service, see Matter of Gee, 11 I&N
Dec. 639 (BIA 1966) and Matter of Lum, 11 I&N Dec. 295 (BIA 1965), advanced age,
see Matter of Ching, 12 I&N Dec. 710 (BIA 1968) (55 years of age), poor health see
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While minimal guidance exists for assessing the weight to be given to
these factors,'64 Anderson and other Board cases do comment on the sig-
nificance assigned to conditions in the country where the applicant faces
deportation. In Anderson, the respondent had urged the Board to find
that conditions in the impoverished country of the Dominican Republic
be dispositive of his extreme hardship claim. Respondent pointed to a
House Judiciary Committee Report that advised consideration of condi-
tions in an applicant's native country be an element in determination of
extreme hardship.' 5 The Board declined to place "critical emphasis on
the economic and political situation" of the home country. Instead, the
Board ruled economic conditions were relevant only when accompanied
by additional factors. 66
Courts have adhered generally to the position that difficulties in
readjusting to life abroad merit little consideration and that economic
loss alone does not constitute extreme hardship. As the court firmly held
in Bueno-Carrillo v. INS,'67 the factor relating to conditions in an alien's
home country is not dispositive in an extreme hardship determination.
1 68
Even in cases in which applicants claimed they would face persecution
abroad, no extreme hardship has been found.'6 9 Courts have reversed
Matter of Leong, 10 I&N Dec. 274 (BIA 1963) (disabled during military service), and
U.S. residence beginning during the formative years, see Matter of Woo, 10 I&N Dec.
347 (BIA 1963) have tipped the scales in favor of an extreme hardship finding.
164 But see Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 558, in which the immigration judge
denied suspension relief to a Mexican couple with three United States citizen
children, aged 8, 9, and 11. The respondents owned their own home and had their
own business. Their application for suspension of deportation was supported by
expert testimony that the family would suffer a substantial financial and emotional
loss by the sale of their home and business, and the children would suffer hardship by
the interruption of their education in the United States.
165 Additional factors include advanced age, severe illness, or family ties. Matter of
Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596, 597-598 (BIA 1978).
166 Id. at 598. See also Kamlet, supra note 104, at 179-89.
167 See Bueno-Carrillo, 682 F.2d at 143, 146. ("We do not believe that Congress
intended the immigration courts to suspend the deportation of all those who will be
unable to maintain the standard of living at home which they have managed to
achieve in this country.")
168 See id.
169 See Matter of Kojoory, 12 I&N Dec. 215, 219-220 (BIA 1967) (a claim of
persecution if respondent were deported to Iran would not support a finding of
extreme hardship); Matter of Liao, 11 I&N Dec. 113, 116 (BIA 1965) ("The question
presented ... is whether the respondent can support a claim of 'extreme hardship' by
relying upon ... the fact that he expressed political views which are not looked upon
with favor by the Nationalist Government of China. We are of the opinion that the
political aspect of this case has no relation to a determination of 'extreme hardship'
... "). See also Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 40 (1?t Cir. 1993) ("In choosing to
discount evidence of persecution when calculating 'extreme hardship' the Board was
within the limits of its discretion.")
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the Board in a few cases involving exceptionally severe conditions
abroad,"' but generally they have supported the Board's determinations
that no extreme hardship exists even when dangerous conditions abroad
threaten the applicant."
After Anderson was decided in 1978, the Board remained silent on the
question of extreme hardship until its 1994 determination in Matter of
Ige. 172 The Board reiterated its position that extreme hardship was not
definable, but dependent on consideration of a range of factors to be nar-
rowly construed. Absent evidence of "advanced age or severe illness
combine[d] with economic detriment," conditions the respondent would
face abroad were not determinative of extreme hardship. Further, the
Board assigned little weight to the presence of young United States citi-
zen children in the family and to the possibility the parents would face
separation from the children, which the Board considered a matter of the
parent's choice.
1 7 3
The narrow, restrictive construction of extreme hardship applied in sus-
pension of deportation cases has carried over to determinations of the
term found in other immigration provisions. In some circumstances that
application is consistent with the overall policy of immigration enforce-
ment. For instance, under INA Section 212(h), aliens otherwise eligible
to immigrate but inadmissible, because of a conviction for a crime of
moral turpitude or engagement in prostitution, may be admitted only
upon a showing of extreme hardship to designated family members.
Extreme hardship is defined for purposes of INA Section 212(h) as it is in
INA Section 244(a)(1) suspension cases.174 This high standard is imposed
on 212(h) applicants notwithstanding the fact that they, unlike the gen-
eral suspension applicants, are eligible to immigrate to the United States
under the visa quota system. It is difficult to argue that application of a
narrow construction of the term to 212(h) cases is inappropriate given a
legitimate immigration policy to restrict the admission of criminals and
others deemed undesirable.
The Attorney General's narrow interpretation of extreme hardship is
inappropriate in other contexts. In the cases of conditional residents
170 See Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9' Cir. 1981) (an applicants
inability to find employment in the country to which he or she would be deported and
the prospect of destitution may be grounds for an "extreme hardship" finding);
Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 568 (91h Cir. 1984) (Board failed to consider
possible persecution claim and respondent's total inability to find work); Carrete-
Michel v. INS, 749 F.2d 490, 493 (8 Cir. 1984) (Board did not give proper weight to
evidence of total inability to work).
171 See, e.g., Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28 (1St Cir. 1993); Diaz-Salazar v. INS,
700 F.2d 1156, 1160 n.4 (7' Cir. 1983).
172 See Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (1994).
173 See id. at 882-83.
174 See Osuchukwu v. INS, 744 F.2d 1136, 1140 (5' Cir. 1984); Matter of
Shaughnessy, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).
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seeking to remove the two year condition on their legal resident status, it
is an inconsistent standard which conflicts with policies which should
favor the applicant. When Congress passed the extreme hardship waiver
for those conditional residents unable to file a joint petition to remove
the two year condition, it expected the waiver to be interpreted in a man-
ner which supported the applicant's continued residence in the United
States and the interests of the applicant's children, and favored a determi-
nation that would account for situations of domestic violence.' 75 The INS
ignored Congress' interpretation and promulgated restrictive regulations
which called for a "common, everyday meaning" of the term. 76 More-
over, the agency refused to acknowledge that domestic violence standing
alone would justify an extreme hardship waiver. 77 In fact, the INS' nar-
row interpretation of the extreme hardship waiver for conditional resi-
dents fueled criticism of the agency for its insensitivity toward domestic
violence victims and contributed to the movement in Congress to pass the
battered spouse waiver.
78
IV. THE CHANGES OF 1996
While 1996 began the most productive period for defining extreme
hardship, it ended with new efforts to bar judicial review of a broad range
of immigration matters. Wang left unresolved the extent to which federal
courts may review extreme hardship determinations. This issue is now
dependent on judicial interpretations of the new bars to judicial review,
particularly those affecting discretionary decisions.
A. Movement Towards a Less Restrictive Standard
In early 1996, the Board issued three succeeding precedent decisions
concerning extreme hardship. While generally adhering to the principles
established in Anderson, the Board laid new groundwork for considera-
"7- See S. REP. No. 99-491, at 8 (1986). See also Calvo, supra note 57, at 610-11.
176 53 Fed. Reg. 30, 015 (August 10, 1988).
177 In a letter to Congresswoman Louise Slaughter, Bonnie Derwinski, Acting INS
Director of Congressional and Public Affairs stated:
Of the two types of waiver applications, the one most likely to be utilized by a
battered spouse is the good faith/good cause application. The extreme hardship
application requires that the alien establish that such hardship would arise as a
result of the alien's deportation. In the case of a battered spouse, the hardship has
already been suffered while in the United States, and it would not be likely to be
aggravated by departure from this country.
Reprinted in 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1428, 1429 (1989). The agency therefore
considered extreme hardship to relate exclusively to hardship from deportation and
not to the hardship occasioned by any abuse in the marriage. See Anderson, supra
note 46, at 1413.
178 Congresswoman Slaughter spearheaded the amendment to IMFA that
provided for battered spouse women now codified at INA §216(c)(4)(C). See
Anderson, supra note 46 at 1414.
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tion of the term in INA Section 244(a)(1) suspension cases, particularly
with regard to consideration of country conditions. Matter of O-J-0 17 9 is
the case of a twenty-four-year old Nicaraguan who had lived in the
United States for ten years and sought suspension of deportation. The
respondent had "relatively weak" family ties in the United States, but
based his suspension claim of extreme hardship he would suffer if
uprooted from and forced to return to the desperate conditions in post-
war Nicaragua.1
8 0
The Board found the Anderson factors "provide[d] a framework for
analysis [of extreme hardship]," but that other factors could also be con-
sidered.18' The determination of hardship necessarily requires the cumu-
lative review of factors, as the adjudicator must consider "the entire
range of factors ... in their totality and determine whether the combina-
tion of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships undeniably asso-
ciated with deportation."' 18 2 The case recognizes that even ordinary
hardships, when viewed in the aggregate, may rise to the level of extreme
hardship.
8 3
O-J-0- appeared to signal that the Board, at least a majority of its
members, was ready to depart from Wang and Anderson. In her concur-
ring opinion, Board Member Rosenberg criticized the dissent for its "iso-
lated examination" of extreme hardship and adherence to a narrow and
restrictive interpretation of the term, which is divorced from an individu-
alized measurement of the hardship factors presented by the respon-
dent.18 4 Extreme hardship determinations require an assessment of the
"level or degree of hardship, including the unique character of the suffer-
ing, but not the extent to which others who may be similarly situated
would or would not experience the same type of hardship to the same
extent."
185
While in previous cases political and economic conditions were
assigned little weight in the overall extreme hardship determination,18 a
majority of the Board in O-J-0- found that the desperate economic and
political conditions in Nicaragua deserved serious attention.'87 The
179 See In Re O-J-0, Int. Dec. 3280 (BIA 1996).
180 Id. at 7-8. O-J-O-'s father had died and his mother and brother lived abroad.
However, he had assimilated into the American culture, had performed exceptionally
in school, was deeply involved in his church, and had developed a strong personal and
social bond to relatives and friends.
181 Id. at 5.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 25 (Rosenberg, concurring).
185 Id. at 29 (emphasis in original).
186 See Matter of Kojoory, 12 I&N Dec. 215 (BIA 1967); Matter of Liao, 11 I&N
Dec. 113 (BIA 1965).
187 In Re O-J-O-, Int. Dec. 3280 at 7 (BIA 1996).
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Board favorably cited a Ninth Circuit case, Tukhowinich v. INS,' which
reversed the Board for its failure to address the volatile political and eco-
nomic situation in Thailand following a military coup.'
8 9
Furthermore, in Matter of L-0-G, 190 a companion case decided the
same day as 0-4-0, a majority of the Board ruled that "[a] restrictive
view of extreme hardship is not mandated either by the Supreme Court
or by our published case law; and, found that L-O-G-, also a Nicaraguan,
had made a prima facie showing of hardship.' 91 The Board supported the
finding on the conditions the family would face in Nicaragua. 192
Nonetheless, strong dissents in O-J-0 and L-O-G indicate that any
movement toward an expansive view of extreme hardship may be met by
stiff opposition from Board members who still favor the narrow, historical
interpretation. 9 The dissenters, using language reminiscent of Wang,19 4
dismissed the claims of hardship as insignificant and no more serious than
the usual hardships incident to deportation. Less than six months after 0-
J-0 and L-0-G, the Board issued a third decision, Matter of Pilch.195
This time a unified court ruled against a Polish couple who had resided in
the United States for approximately ten years, had three U.S. citizen chil-
188 64 F.3d 460 ( 9t- Cir. 1995). The case concerned a Thai woman who had been in
the United States ten years, but was single, had no United States citizen or lawful
resident family, and had not been active in community organizations in the United
States.
189 Id. at 463.
190 In Re L-O-G, Int. Dec. 3281 (BIA 1996).
191 Id. at 8.
192 Nicaragua was described by the Board as "an extremely poor country, still in
political turmoil, with a shattered economy, very high unemployment, and minimal
government services." Id. at 12.
193 While the decisions represented the most expansive determinations of extreme
hardship in precedented cases, some Board members were reluctant to affirmatively
say so. The majority in O-J-0- termed the decision "a close case," O-J-O-, Int Dec.
3280 at 9, and Board Member David B. Holmes in his concurring opinion in the same
case considered the ruling to be not out of line with earlier Board decisions. Id. at 20.
However, the case did prompt members of Congress to take action and replace
extreme hardship with the more stringent standard of "exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship" now attached to cancellation of removal under INA §240A(b), the
statute which replaced INA §244(a)(1) in IIRAIRA. Cong. Reg. No. 828 at 213, 104 "h
Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). Citing O-J-O-, the report states, "The extreme hardship
standard has been weakened by recent administrative decisions holding that forced
removal of an alien who has become 'acclimated' to the United States would
constitute a hardship sufficient to support a grant of suspension of deportation."
194 In Re 0-4-0, Int. Dec. 3280, at 47. While the dissenters maintained they
favored a flexible approach to the extreme hardship determination, their support for
Wang is unwavering. ". . .[T]he Board long ago resolved the ambiguity in the
statutory language in favor of a narrow construction that mandated strong showings
of hardship to obtain relief."
-95 Matter of Pilch, Int. Dec. 3298 (BIA 1996).
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dren between the ages of four and six, two siblings who were legal resi-
dents, and had an established, lucrative business. The Board in Pilch
stated it did not construe extreme hardship narrowly, 196 but the negative
finding in light of the respondents' lengthy residence, strong community
ties, and presence of U.S. citizen children mirrored Wang and its progeny.
The Board's willingness to distance itself from a restrictive view of
extreme hardship, to "consider the entire range of factors ... in their
totality,"'197 and to weigh more heavily the desperate country conditions
the alien will face conforms with the humanitarian intent behind the sus-
pension statute. 0-4-0- provides some aid to VAWA applicants, but the
final determination of any extreme hardship claim is still dependant on
the facts and circumstances in each case and the adjudicators preferences
as to the weight assigned to one or more of the factors considered.' 9
B. The Agency Confronts VAWA
Over the past two years, the Department of Justice has received and
adjudicated over five thousand VAWA self-petitions.' 99 The INS has
approved the majority of these petitions, in large part due to the promul-
gation of favorable interim regulations for adjudicating VAWA self-peti-
tions and to the centralization of adjudication of all self-petitions into one
service center staffed by officers who received VAWA specific training.
20 0
However, the benefit of such positive determinations are overshadowed
by disparities seen in many cases handled outside the service center and
by the agency's failure to take appropriate steps to ensure that VAWA
cases are adjudicated in a manner consistent with the interim rules and
the purpose of VAWA.
Implementation of VAWA has been a slow and uneven process.
20'
While the law authorized self-petitions to be filed beginning January 1,
1995, the Department of Justice did not issue interim rules or begin adju-
dications until March 26, 1996.202 The proposed, unfinalized 203 regula-
tions govern the INS adjudication of self-petitions. The EOIR, which
196 Id. at 6.
197 In Re O-J-O, Int. Dec. 3280, at 5.
198 Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (1994). See also Underwood, supra note 100, at
903.
199 Report of adjudications for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 on file with the author.
200 The INS Central Office has implemented at the Vermont Service Center
training of VAWA adjudications by domestic violence advocates (notes of interview
with Gail Pendleton, Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild) (on file
with author). However, while the Department of Justice has conducted training at
some field offices, the Department has yet to implement broad-based training in the
dynamics of domestic violence and the immigration provisions of VAWA at the INS
district level. See id. It is reported that some officers have been resistant to such
training. See Gilbert, supra note 72, at 11.
201 See Calvo, The Violence Against Women Act, supra note 11.
202 61 Fed. Reg. 13061-13079 (Mar. 26, 1996).
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oversees the immigration courts, did not issue rules governing VAWA
suspension/cancellation cases.20 4 On April 16, 1996, the INS issued a
memorandum to field offices addressing the adjudication of self-peti-
tions. 2 5 Initially, the adjudication of VAWA self-petitions was decentral-
ized in the four INS service centers which are also charged with
processing general visa petitions, and to the INS district offices which
would receive VAWA petitions from applicants qualified to apply for
adjustment of status. On May 6, 1997, the INS issued a second memoran-
dum to its field offices in conjunction with its decision to consolidate
adjudication of VAWA self-petitions at the INS service center in
Vermont.206
The INS did take steps towards setting standards for determining
extreme hardship consistent with the purpose of VAWA. Receptive to
proposals made by advocates for domestic violence victims, the INS
issued rules that expand the factors considered relevant for determina-
tions of extreme hardship in VAWA cases.20 7 Moreover, on October 16,
1998, the agency issued a memorandum specifically addressing extreme
hardship for purposes of VAWA self-petitions.208  Unlike the INS rules
203 Final regulations were expected by spring, 1998, but were initially stalled while
the agency considered whether applicants for VAWA self-petitions were to submit to
fingerprinting at INS officers. As part an effort to ensure the integrity of criminal
records checks, prompted by concerns that the agency had naturalized criminal aliens,
the INS now mandates that all applicants for adjustment of status and naturalization
be fingerprinted at designated INS offices. Presently, VAWA applicants, who must
demonstrate good moral character, submit clearance letters from local police stations.
The final regulations are now pending a final review by the INS General Counsel.
Interview with Gail Pendleton, Immigration Project, National Lawyers Guild and co-
coordinator of the National Network on Behalf of Battered Immigrant Women (notes
on file with the author).
204 The INS and the EOIR, which include the Immigration Courts and the EOIR,
are separate agencies within the Department of Justice. GORDON, MAILMAN, &
YALE-LoEHR, supra note 8.
205 Memorandum, Implementation of Crime Bill Self-Petitioning for Abused or
Battered Spouses and Children of U.S. Citizens or Lawful Permanent Residents, Apr.
16, 1996 [hereinafter Aleinikoff Memo].
206 Memorandum, Supplemental Guidance on Battered Alien Self-Petitioning
Process and Related Issues, May 6, 1997 [hereinafter Virtue I Memo]. The
Department of Justice announced that the purpose for centralization of VAWA
petitions was to "ensure sensitive and expeditious processing of the petitions filed by
this class of at-risk applicants." 62 Fed.Reg. 16,607-08 (Apr. 7, 1997).
207 Preamble to Interim Regulation, 61 Fed. Reg. 13061 (Mar. 26, 1996). To its
credit, the INS worked closely with advocates from organizations serving victims of
domestic violence. See Gilbert, supra note 72, at 4.
208 Memorandum dated October 16, 1998 for Terrance M. O'Reilly from Paul
Virtue, Extreme Hardship and Documentary Requirements Involving Battered Spouse
and Children, reprinted in 76 INTERPRERnR RELEASES 162 (Jan. 25, 1999) [hereinafter
Virtue II Memo].
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promulgated following IMFA, the interim rules for adjudication of
VAWA self-petitions 0 9 encourage consideration of the nature and effect
of the abuse suffered by the applicant and her family.210 The INS must
"consider all credible evidence of extreme hardship submitted with the
self-petition, including evidence of hardship arising from circumstances
surrounding the abuse. 211 In the preamble to the rules, the INS links
extreme hardship to the conditions the VAWA applicant and her family
would face abroad if deported,212 suggesting that "the circumstances sur-
rounding domestic abuse may cause extreme hardship., 21 3 The preamble
and the April 16, 1996 memorandum set forth six factors in assessing
extreme hardship:
(1) the nature and extent of the physical and psychological conse-
quences of the battering or extreme cruelty;
(2) the impact of the loss of access to the U.S. courts and criminal
justice system (including but not limited to the ability to obtain
and enforce: orders of protection; criminal investigations and
prosecutions; and family law proceedings or court orders regard-
ing child support, maintenance, child custody, and visitation);
(3) the self-petitioner's and/or the self-petitioner's child's need for
social, medical, mental health, or other supportive services which
would not be available or reasonably accessible in the foreign
country;
(4) the existence of laws, social practices, or customs in the foreign
country that would penalize or ostracize the self-petitioner or
self-petitioner's child for having been the victim of abuse, for
leaving the abusive situation, or for actions taken to stop the
abuse;
(5) the abuser's ability to travel to the foreign country and the abil-
ity and willingness of foreign authorities to protect the self-peti-
tioner and/or the self-petitioner's child from future abuse; and
209 53 Fed. Reg. 30011 (Aug. 10, 1988) With regard to "extreme hardship" the
IMFA rules provide only that the term be interpreted with "common everyday
meaning." Id. at 30015.
210 Preamble to Interim Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. at 13067-13068.
211 Id. The full text of the rules provides:
The Service will consider all credible evidence of extreme hardship submitted
with a self-petition, including evidence of hardship arising from circumstances
surrounding the abuse. The extreme hardship claim will be evaluated on a case
by case basis after a review of the evidence in the case. Self-petitioners are
encouraged to cite and document all applicable factors, since there is no
guarantee that a particular reason or reasons will result in a finding that
deportation would cause extreme hardship. Hardship to persons other than the
self-petitioner or the self-petitioner's child cannot be considered in determining
whether a self-petitioning spouse's deportation would cause extreme hardship.
212 See supra note 210.
213 61 Fed. Reg. at 13067. See 8 C.F.R. 204.2(e)(viii).
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(6) the likelihood that the abuser's family, friends, or others acting
on behalf of the abuser in the foreign country would physically
or psychologically harm the self-petitioner and/or the self-peti-
tioner's child. 4
The rules and memorandum are a positive movement favoring abused
immigrants who claim extreme hardship.215 So too is the INS decision to
route all VAWA self-petitions from INS district offices to a special unit
trained in VAWA adjudication at a remote INS service center.216
However, the interim rules fall short of setting firm standards for deter-
mining extreme hardship consistent with purposes of VAWA. The six
domestic violence-related factors listed in the preamble are not included
in the rules, nor do the rules weigh the factors against other traditional
factors.217 Moreover, while the preamble and memoranda identify the
domestic violence related factors for consideration in extreme hardship
determinations, they also direct adjudicators to consider case law inter-
preting hardship in suspension of deportation cases. 218 The rules fail to
center the extreme hardship determinations squarely on factors relating
to abuse and the need for protection, and instead permit determinations
based on review of factors that may not relate to situations and exper-
iences of battered immigrant women.219
The rules and INS memoranda dictate standards and procedures for
VAWA self-petitions, and thus, do not address "extreme hardship" deter-
minations in deportation and removal proceedings.22 ° Until recently, no
214 61 Fed. Reg. 13061 (Mar. 26, 1996); Aleinikoff Memo, supra note 205, at 8-9.
215 Moreover, INS rules recognize that VAWA is consistent with United States
policy favoring family immigration. Approved self-petitions accord the beneficiary
with immediate relative a second preference status. If the VAWA applicant had been
the beneficiary of a previously filed visa petition, the earlier priority date assigned to
the petition is transferred to the approved self-petition. 61 Fed. Reg. 13077; 8 C.F.R.
204.2(h)(2). Additionally, if the abuser were to lose his legal status, the abused
spouse and children who have approved self-petitions retain their eligibility to
immigrate. 61 Fed. Reg. 13073; 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(H)(iii).
216 See supra note 206.
217 Compare the preamble at 61 Fed Reg. 13067 with 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(viii) (1997).
218 61 Fed. Reg. at 13067. "The phrase 'extreme hardship' has acquired a settled
judicial and administrative meaning . . . largely in the context of suspension of
deportation cases under section 244 of the Act." See also Virtue II Memo, supra note
208, at 3, which states, "The meaning of [extreme hardship] has, however, been well-
explored in the judicial and administrative setting." The INS continued reliance on
Matter of Anderson, a case appropriate for long-term undocumented residents is
inappropriate for VAWA applicants and prevents a VAWA-centered approach to
adjudication.
219 See also Gilbert, supra note 72, at 9.
220 61 Fed. Reg. 13061 (Interim Rules regarding Petition to Classify Alien as
Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen or as a Preference Immigrant: Self-
Petitioning for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and Children).
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rules governing "extreme hardship" in expulsion proceedings existed, but
following passage of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American
Relief Act (NACARA),221 legislation to amend IIRAIRA so that certain
nationalities, including Central Americans, would be able to apply for
relief from deportation and removal under the less stringent pre-
IIRAIRA rules,222 the government issued interim regulations which set
standards subject to the narrow Anderson factors for "extreme hardship"
determination in all cases.223 The government failed to include in the
new rules the special extreme hardship factors identified previously in the
VAWA self-petition regulations, but after receiving numerous comments
which requested consideration of the circumstances of battered spouses
and children in deportation and removal proceedings, the government
issued final regulations which incorporate domestic violence-related fac-
tors for "extreme hardship" determinations in cases involving battered
spouses and children.224
The agency continues to be reluctant to assign any weight to "extreme
hardship"factors, and requires that VAWA applicants individually prove
hardship on a case-by-case basis.225 However, over time and through
case law, the contours of the term have been set, based on the considera-
tion of a narrow set of circumstances that favor the agency's interest in
strict controls over illegal immigration. VAWA applicants must contend
with this long-standing definition and the inclination of adjudicators to
consistently apply the traditional meaning.
The Attorney General is not bound under all circumstances to apply a
narrow construction of "extreme hardship, '226 and retains broad discre-
tion in making the determinations relative to inunigration and claims for
221 Pub. L. No. 105-139.
222 IIRAIRA's repeal of INS §244 suspension of deportation and establishment of
the new, more restrictive cancellation of removal under INA §240A(b)(1) placed
obstacles to gaining relief from expulsion for many Central Americans and nationals
of former Soviet-bloc countries who had fled their countries and sought refuge in the
United States. See 74 INTrPRETRn RELEASES 1837 (Dec. 8, 1997). NACARA
provides an amnesty for unlawfully-present Nicaraguans and Cubans, and permits
nationals of El Salvador, Guatemala, and the former Soviet Union, and other Eastern
Europeans to apply for suspension of deportation under the less stringent rules pre-
IIRAIRA. Id.
223 63 Fed. Reg. 64895, 64902-64904 (Nov. 24, 1998). The preamble to the rules
sets forth a lengthy discussion of the case law governing "extreme hardship" including
Matter of Anderson, Matter of O-J-O-, and Matter of Pilch. The proposed rules
include a list of factors drawn primarily from Anderson.
224 64 Fed. Reg. 27856, 27863 (May 21, 1999); 8 C.F.R. §240.20(c0), 240.58.
225 8 C.F.R. 240.58(a) ("Extreme hardship is evaluated on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account the particular facts and circumstances of each case."). See Virtue
II Memo, supra note 208, at 4.
226 Although the Court found that "the Board did not exceed its authority" when
it applied extreme hardship narrowly, the Court affirmed the Board's discretion to
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relief from deportation and removal.227 The meaning given to "extreme
hardship" may be altered as determinations of the term may be "var[ied]
to meet the purposes of the law" and the harm to be remedied.228 When
a given statutory term is defined narrowly in one section, the same term
may be construed differently for purposes of another section. As the
Supreme Court stated in Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers v. United States,
"Most words have different shades of meaning, and consequently may be
variously construed, not only when they occur in different statutes, but
when used more than once in the same statute or even in the same
section. "229
The interests at stake require not only that the factors related to abuse
and the need for protection be considered, but that any extreme hardship
claim support the statute's goal to end violence, remove deportation as a
tool of the abuser, and preserve the integrity of family-based immigra-
tion. The Attorney General should find that the factors relating to abuse
and common to victims of domestic violence applying for VAWA relief
presumptively support a finding of extreme hardship.230 The government
interpret the term ". . . the Act commits their definition in the first instance to the
Attorney General and [her] delegates." Wang, 450 U.S. at 144.
227 In Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 n. 156 (1956), the Court ruled that the
Attorney General had "unfettered discretion" to decide to suspend deportation. See
also Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1987); Achacoso-
Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d 1260, 1264 (7 t' Cir. 1985).
228 See Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
229 Id. at 433. See also Grand Lodge of International Association of Machinists v.
King, 335 F.2d 340, 344 (9th Cir. 1964). Statutes may have different purposes and "the
reason for the limited scope of one [is] absent in the context of the other."
Erlenbaugh v. U.S., 409 U.S. 239, 245-47 (1972). See also Nations Bank of North
Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) ("As our
decision underscores, a characterization fitting in certain contests may be unsuitable
in others.").
One may posit if the agency were to redefine extreme hardship for purposes of
VAWA, it would thereby be disregarding the intent of Congress, which in 1994 when
VAWA passed, was well aware of agency and court interpretations of the term and
arguably favored a narrow meaning. However, Congress was silent as to its intent,
and the agency should therefore be free to assign to the term whatever meaning best
fits the purpose of the statute. Additionally, when Congress passed IIRAIRA in
1996, it did not add to VAWA relief the heightened standard of exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship as it did for the new INA §240A(b) cancellation of
removal relief. In fact, one may argue that because Congress was aware of In Re 0-I-
O and added the more restrictive hardship standard to INA §240A(b) in response to
the case, that Congress favored a more relaxed standard for extreme hardship for
purposes of relief for battered spouses and children.
230 Similarly, in her discussion of the new substantial connection test assigned
VAWA applicants in IIRAIRA, Linda Kelley encouraged the INS to incorporate
presumptions favoring the victim in its drafting of regulations. See Kelley supra note
11, at 326.
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should mandate that the safety and welfare of the applicant remain the
primary focus in any determination of extreme hardship of victims of
domestic violence.2 31 In contrast to the minor role country conditions
have played traditionally, findings that women will face hardships inci-
dent to the abuse in her native country, a fear many Mexican VAWA
applicants maintain,232 should weigh heavily in the extreme hardship
determination. 233 To the extent the traditional factors, such as family ties,
231 Assigning presumptive weight to VAWA-related factors necessarily restricts the
choices given the adjudicator in the extreme hardship determination. Extreme
hardship is a standard of eligibility and it is appropriate and necessary to establish
guideposts to define the term. Additionally, if as one court has ruled, that extreme
hardship is wholly discretionary and now barred from judicial review under
IIRAIRA's new rules, establishing firm standards are needed for the protection of
battered spouses and children. See Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147 (9'" Cir. 1997) and
discussion infra at Section IV, B, 1.
I also favor establishing rules which limit the "leeway of choice" given the
adjudicator to make the ultimate discretionary decision whether to grant cancellation
of removal/suspension of deportation to an undocumented battered spouse. Heyman,
supra note 109, at 879 (non-citizens receive greater protection when the agency has
standards to apply to discretionary adjudication and judicial review is available). See
also Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut, supra note 146
(arguing also for more specific standards to guide discretionary adjudications). There
is a legislative mandate favoring battered spouses and children. Absent strong
countervailing negative factors, it would seem inappropriate for the immigration court
to deny as a matter of discretion an application for suspension/cancellation based on
VAWA. In Matter of Ricco, 15 I&N Dec. 548, 549 (BIA 1976), the Board objected to
consideration of the views of a House Judiciary Committee in the discretionary
determination of a suspension case, and ruled that discretion should be governed by
the particular circumstances of the case. However, while the Board may be reluctant
to consider a single Congressional report, its discretionary decisions most certainly
must be governed by a broad-based Congressional policy. See Matter of Lee, 11 I&N
Dec. 649, 650-51 (BIA 1966). Moreover, the Board gave favorable treatment to
asylum seekers, who like domestic violence victims, face life-threatening
consequences to removal. See Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 469 (BIA 1987).
232 See discussion infra Section V.
233 This article focuses on the country conditions a VAWA applicant may face if
deported and argues that dangerous conditions should be given presumptive weight. I
do not thereby contend that a battered woman who will not face hardship tied to
conditions in her home country cannot demonstrate extreme hardship for purposes of
eligibility under VAWA. Each and all of the factors tied to battery and abuse should
weigh heavily in the extreme hardship determination. The extent and nature of the
battery and extreme cruelty a woman has withstood may alone be so severe to
constitute extreme hardship. Even in traditional cases, a single hardship factor has
been found to constitute extreme hardship. See Meija-Carrillo v. INS, 656 F.2d 520,
522 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Urbano de Malaluan v. INS, 577 F.2d 589, 593-94 (9' Cir.
1978)) ("Separation from family alone may establish extreme hardship.").
Furthermore, in the context of asylum cases, the Board has evaluated the nature of
abuse in terms of relief. It is well accepted that in cases of severe past persecution,
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lengthy residence, and attachment to community do not relate to the
abuse suffered by the applicant and her need for protection, they should
be assigned little weight in the overall determination of extreme hardship
in a VAWA case.
234
Consistent with its broad powers over immigration matters, the agency
can set standards for consideration of discretionary relief which benefit
specific groups. The government recently accepted it has such authority
when it established a group-specific definition of extreme hardship to aid
Salvadorans and Guatemalans applying for suspension of deportation
under NACARA.23 5 Once a Central American NACARA applicant
submits an application which includes questions pertaining to hardship, s/
he is presumed to meet the extreme hardship requirements, a presump-
tion the INS has the burden to overcome.23 6 Significantly, the Depart-
even in situations in which future persecution is unlikely, asylum may be granted.
Matter of Chen, Int. Dec. 3104 (BIA 1989); Matter of B-, Int. Dec. 3251 (BIA 1995).
234 If the Attorney General fails to highlight the importance of the abuse and
protection in extreme hardship determinations adjudicators will have license to deny
applications based on a woman's ties to family in her home country, minimal
residence in the United States, and lack of participation in community groups. Family
and community ties and protection are relevant, but must be viewed in the context of
domestic violence. A VAWA applicant may have no U.S. family or her only family in
the U.S. may consist of small children. While she may have members of her family
abroad, they may not be able to provide her with protection and solace. Minimal
residence should not be viewed negatively because the suspension and cancellation
removal statutes only require three years physical presence in contrast to the seven
and ten years required for traditional suspension and cancellation of removal.
Moreover, there is no term of residence required for VAWA self-petitions. Strong
attachment to community has been required for suspension applicants to gain legal
status, but battered women often are isolated and are unable to participate in
community activities. Their ties to the community also must be considered in the
context of the abuse they have suffered.
235 64 Fed. Reg. 27856, 27864-27867 (May 21, 1999). The decision of the
Department of Justice to extend a rebuttable presumption of extreme hardship for
Salvadorans and Guatemalans followed intense lobbying by immigrant advocacy
organizations and Central American governments. See Hardship Determination in
NACARA Regulations Sparks Controversy, as Clinton Administration Ponders Scope,
76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 412, 414-15 (Mar. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Hardship
Determination in NACARA]; Memorandum, INS No. 1965-98 Implementation of
Section 2.3 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, (Jan. 8,
1999) [hereinafter INS No. 1965-98] (on file with the author) (The memorandum
prepared by a counsel for the Embassy of El Salvador in response to the proposed
regulations on NACARA, argued that group specific standard of extreme hardship
for Central Americans applying for NACARA relief is consistent with the statute and
in keeping with the Attorney General's broad authority to interpret hardship).
236 64 Fed. Reg. 27866. The government considered its approach to be a balance
between providing a blanket hardship finding and evaluating hardship on a case-by-
case basis. Id. at 27865. There had been stiff opposition to a group-specific hardship
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ment of Justice considered, but rejected, the approach to determining
"extreme hardship" provides to VAWA applicants, that of simply promul-
gating rules containing a list of factors.237
There is every reason to establish a similar approach for VAWA appli-
cants who must also meet the "extreme hardship" standard. The agency
has identified the domestic violence-related hardship factors. A group
specific determination that immigrant victims who suffer one or more of
the identified hardships presumptively meet the extreme hardship stan-
dard would be consistent with the ameliorative purpose of VAWA and
the legislative history.
1. Judicial Intervention - If Mrs. Wang Were A Battered Spouse
Although Congress retains the power to limit judicial review in immi-
gration matters,2 8 non-citizens have long enjoyed access to federal courts
for review of immigration decisions.23 9 The previous discussion on the
litigation surrounding suspension of deportation demonstrates how fed-
eral courts have been quite active in reviewing discretionary applications
for relief from deportation,240 and how non-citizens have successfully
challenged the denial of applications for relief and exposed agency abuse
of discretion."4 As is often the case with vague statutory terms,242 there
has been much litigation surrounding extreme hardship determina-
standard from some Republican representatives who perceived the proposal as a
move to grant a blanket amnesty to Salvadorans and Guatemalans. Hardship
Determination in NACARA, supra note 235, at 414. But see INS No. 1915-98, supra
note 235, which also urged that the INS had the authority to withhold and extend a
discretionary benefit to specified groups as long as consistent with the statutory
scheme, and Fook Hong Mak v. INS, 435 F.2d 728, 729-30 (2nd Cir. 1970) . "The
legislature's grant of discretion to accord a privilege does not imply a mandate that
this must inevitably be done by examining each case rather than by identifying
groups." INS No. 1915-98, supra note 235, at 4.
237 64 Fed. Reg. at 27865. The Department considered that a group-specific
hardship would be consistent with the statute, and "would be appropriate and would
further an interest in greater administrative efficiency." Id.
238 See supra note 81 for discussion of Congress plenary power over immigration
matters. See also Lenni Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to
Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CoNN. L. REv. 1411, 1412-16 (1998).
239 THoMAs ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PRocEss AND POLICY 927-35 (40 ed. 1998)
[hereinafter ALEiNiKOFF ET AL.]
240 See supra Section III.
241 See cases cited supra note 170. Even when federal courts challenge agency
decisions, they should not be viewed as opponents. As Professor Heyman notes, "the
relationship must be reconceptualized to reflect the need for dialogue between the
two branches, a dialogue that can lead to the orderly and coherent development of
the law." Heyman, supra note 105, at 865.
242 The INA contains numerous vague terms that require interpretation and
thereby frequently foster litigation. See M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Review: A Nice
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tions.243 However, with its 1996 legislation, Congress dramatically lim-
ited the power of federal courts to review agency orders of deportation/
removal, 244 and curtailed review of discretionary decisions. 245 These
changes lead to the troubling prospect there will be no avenue of judicial
review of agency determinations which are inconsistent with the amelio-
rative purpose of VAWA. To be decided is the extent to which the new
rules for judicial review bar review in immigration cases, including discre-
tionary decisions, and more particularly whether immigration eligibility
Thing? Article 111, Separation of Powers and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1525, 1529.
243 In the early cases, jurisdiction was grounded on the writ of habeas corpus, Art.
1, §9, cl. 2 of the Constitution. ALEINIKOFF ET AL, supra note 239, at 928. Later
litigants relied on the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedure
Act until 1961 when Congress added §106 to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality
Act. Id. at 928-32. See also Benson, supra note 238, at 1424 (despite early
Congressional efforts to limit jurisdiction over immigration matters in 1907 and 1917,
courts reviewed deportation and exclusion redress via habeas corpus). See Kamlet,
Judicial Review of "Extreme Hardship," supra note 104, at 196-200 (even following
Wang in which the court ruled that the definition of "extreme hardship" lies with the
Attorney General, courts continued to grapple with interpretation of the standard).
244 AEDPA, the first of the two statutes passed in 1996, eliminated judicial review
of deportation orders of non-citizens who are aggravated felons, as defined by INA
§101(a)(43). AEDPA §440a. Shortly after, Congress passed IIRAIRA, which
repealed INA §106(a), the statute which since 1962 had governed judicial review of
deportation orders. IIRAIRA established new §242 that bars judicial review of
removal orders in the cases of selected criminals and review of discretionary
decisions.
245 IIRAIRA §306 bars review of certain discretionary grants including
cancellation of removal under §240A(b), and "any other decision or action . . .
specified ... to be in the discretion of the Attorney General."
In the wake of legislation to bar judicial review, the EOIR, in "response to the
enormous and unprecedented increase in the number of appeals being filed with the
Board," has taken the disturbing step of proposing to streamline its own appellate
review. In the proposed rule published at 64 Fed. Reg. 49043-46 (Sept. 14, 1998), the
EOIR would give authority to a single Board member to affirm without opinion the
decision of an Immigration Judge. See 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1301 (Sept. 21,
1998). One of the categories of cases that the new rules would impact is discretionary
decisions. The preamble to the proposed rules states that the rules would authorize
the Board chairman to designate for purposes of the streamlining procedure
(3) cases seeking discretionary relief for which the appellant clearly appears to
be statutorily ineligible;
(4) cases challenging discretionary decisions where it does not appear that the
decision-maker has applied the wrong criteria or deviated from precedents of the
Board or the controlling law from the United States Court of Appeals or the
United States Supreme Court;
63 Fed. Reg. at 49042, reported in 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES at 1311.
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standards, like extreme hardship, which involve a mix of discretion and
statutory interpretation remain subject to any review.246
IIRAIRA repealed INA §106a and established new, more restrictive
rules for judicial review.247 Review of orders of deportation and new
removal proceedings lie with the circuit court, but the statute places a
number of limitations on those cases that may be heard." 8 Of concern to
VAWA applicants who would apply for cancellation of removal and be
denied is §242(a)(2)(B) that bars judicial review of "any judgment
regarding the granting of relief under §§212(h), 212(i), 240A, 240B, or
245.? "249 and further eliminates federal court review for "any other deci-
sion or action of the Attorney General the authority of which is specified
under this chapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General... .250
IRAIRA also sets forth an all-encompassing review restriction at
§242(g):
[E]xcept as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate
cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this
chapter.251
There has been vigorous litigation centered on the court-stripping pro-
visions, and so far most courts have rejected the notion that the new legis-
lation bars all judicial review of constitutional claims and issues of
statutory interpretation.252 However, the negative impact of §242 on
246 This section does not purport to present an exhaustive treatment of the new
judicial review rules. For a comprehensive analysis of the effects of AEDPA's and
IIRAIRA's changes to judicial review, see Benson, supra note 238, and Medina, supra
note 242.




251 INA §242(g). But see Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,
525 U.S.__, 119 S.Ct. 2016 (1999) in which the Supreme Court narrowly construed
INA §242(g) to limit jurisdiction only to areas specified by the statute.
252 Most of the litigation that has emerged, since Congress passed its court-
stripping measures, concerns foreign nationals deportable based on criminal conduct.
AEDPA and IIRAIRA curtailed judicial review in the cases of non-citizens
deportable for a broad range of offenses, including those relating to drugs, firearms,
and aggravated felonies. Litigants have asserted that judicial review remains by way
of habeas corpus, long a mainstay of review of immigration decisions, and that,
further, the absence of any judicial intervention violates the Constitution. See
Benson, supra note 238. While conceding that serious constitutional issues remain
reviewable even for criminal non-citizens, the government has repeatedly suggested
that Congress implicitly repealed habeas review under 28 U.S.C. §2241 for
immigration decisions, and that AEDPA's repeal of INA §106(a)(10) and the
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applications for suspension of deportation and extreme hardship determi-
nations was felt immediately in the case Kalaw v. INS.253 The court ruled
that statutory eligibility questions, such as whether the respondent met
the required physical presence or, to some extent, the good moral charac-
ter requirement, were reviewable, but was not persuaded that the nega-
tive extreme hardship determination was subject to review under
IRAIRA's new jurisdiction rules and §242.254 The court found that
determination to be "clearly a discretionary act"and thus no longer sub-
ject to review under the new rules.255
Are all avenues of judicial review now foreclosed for VAWA applicants
denied relief based on negative extreme hardship findings? Will negative
determinations raise constitutional or statutory eligibility questions for
sweeping provisions in the new INA §242(g) block habeas corpus jurisdiction for
aliens. The government has argued that AEDPA and IIRAIRA do not implicate the
Constitution because courts of appeal retain jurisdiction in immigration cases over
substantial constitutional questions. See, e.g., Mojica v. Reno, 920 F. Supp. 130
(E.D.N.Y. 1997), affd sub nom Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2nd Cir. 1998), cert.
denied (1999). Notwithstanding, most courts have rejected the government's
sweeping arguments. See Lerma de Gardia v. INS, 141 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1998);
Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309 (3r' Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1842 (1997);
Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1S' Cir. 1996); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS 92 F.3d 27 (2 ,d Cir.
1996). But see LaGuerre v. INS, 164 F.3d 1035 (7 "h Cir. 1998) (District courts lack
jurisdiction to consider habeas claims). In a significant post-AEDPA and IIRAIRA
decision from a court appeals, Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110 (' Cir. 1998), cert.
denied (1999), the First Circuit ruled that writs of habeas corpus remain available in
immigration cases, and that Congress did not explicitly repeal §2241 for purposes of
immigration cases in either AEDPA or IIRAIRA. Id. at 121. Furthermore, the court
declined to limit habeas jurisdiction in order to avoid the serious and substantial
constitutional questions which it would be forced to address if AEDPA and IIRAIRA
were held to have repealed §2241, that of Congress' power under Article III to strip
federal courts of jurisdiction and the Suspension Clause guarantee of habeas corpus.
Id. at 123. The Goncalves court did not fully resolve the scope of review in habeas
cases involving immigration matters, although it did permit review of the petitioners'
issue of statutory interpretation. Id. at 124-25. See also Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d at
122 (court has jurisdiction under habeas to review statutory claims which "affect the
substantial rights of aliens"). Several district courts had ruled that review was
confined to only "grave constitutional error or a fundamental miscarriage of justice."
Duldulao v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 476, 479 (D. Haw. 1997); see also Mbiya v. INS, 930 F.
Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (used the term "manifest injustice"); Ozoanya v.
Reno, 968 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1997) ("substantial constitutional claims" would be
heard in habeas cases); Gutierrez-Martinez v. Reno, 989 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Ga.
1998); Morisath v. Smith, 988 F. Supp. 1333 (W.D. Wash. 1997); Jurado-Gutierrez v.
Greene, 977 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Colo. 1997). The origins of these heightened standards
come from rules applied to state prisoner post-conviction relief. Goncalves, 144 F.3d
at 124. See also Benson, supra note 238, at 1470-71.
253 133 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir.1997).
254 Id. at 1152.
255 Id.
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which review is guaranteed? Or, are extreme hardship determinations
purely discretionary as concluded by the Kalow case256 and now entirely
outside the scope of judicial review?
Given the consensus that the new rules do not bar review of constitu-
tional violations, cases which challenge the agency's failure to adhere to
established guidelines will be considered. 257 Beyond the constitutional
issues, courts will be asked to decide the scope Congressional intent to
bar review of discretionary decisions and to settle long-standing questions
as to the character of extreme hardship determinations. Kalaw correctly
interpreted the intent of Congress to bar review of the ultimate discre-
tionary decision of the adjudicator whether to grant or deny an applica-
tion for specified benefits under the INA. However, most forms of
immigration relief are infused with discretionary interpretations of law
and fact. 58 Extreme hardship is an example of a statutory eligibility stan-
dard that involves the use of discretion in final determinations. Section
242 can be more narrowly construed to bar the decision only as to
whether to grant or deny relief.25 Unfortunately, Kalaw signals that
courts are prepared to broadly interpret §242 to bar review not only of
256 The word "discretion" is, as Professor Heyman states, a "conversation
stopper." Heyman, supra note 109, at 865.
257 See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). See also
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (statutory provision
limiting judicial review in legalization cases did not preclude the review of a case
challenging violation of the statute and constitutions); Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS, at
1265 (a court can act when the Board violates procedural rights).
258 Professor Kanstroom describes immigration law as a "fabric of discretion and
judicial deference." Kanstroom, supra note 146, at 709. Some statutes are expressly
discretionary but other provisions involving a wide range of adjudicatory functions
have come to be considered discretionary. Discretion expressly prescribed by the
statue is termed by Professor Kanstroom as "delegated discretion." Id. at 751-59. He
then sets forth forms of interpretative discretion which includes "a mix of 'legal'
categorization and definition with factual inquiry," a process difficult to define and
monitor. Id. at 764.
259 Section 242 can be construed to preserve the right of access to court review for
aliens denied suspension/cancellation of removal. See Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) ("judicial review of final agency action by an
aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that
such was the purpose of Congress.") Any doubt as to the applicability of INA §242 to
review any or all aspects of deportation/removal cases should be resolved in favor of
judicial access. For instance, the statute restricts review of decisions "regarding the
granting of relief' under the specified statutes, language which limits the bar to the
aspect of decisions expressly discretionary, Le. the ultimate decision to grant an
application. INA §242(2)(B)(i). Moreover, INA §242(2)(B)(ii) limits review of other
decisions or actions which are "specified under this title to be in the discretion of the
Attorney General," again limiting consideration to only those decisions Congress has
expressly prescribed to be discretionary. This analysis preserves for consideration
questions as to whether a given applicant satisfies standards of eligibility, albeit the
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the ultimate discretionary decisions, but also statutory eligibility issues
intertwined with discretion.2 60
Ultimately, the Supreme Court will resolve the debate left open by
Wang, and renewed by Congress' desire to curtail immigration litigation
of discretionary decisions, the extent to which the judiciary may review
extreme hardship determinations.26 '
agency may exercise some discretion in the interpretation and application of eligibility
issues.
A narrow reading of §242 which encompasses limits on review of only the ultimate
discretionary decision in a given relief statute is consistent with a pattern of court
decisions which have generally been exceedingly differential to that aspect of agency
discretion. In Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956), the Court found that the final decision
as to whether to grant or deny relief had no statutory standards and was left entirely
to the Attorney General to decide. Id. at 353. In Achacosa-Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d
1260 (7 h Cir. 1985), Judge Easterbrook described a process of plenary discretion and
judicial restraint in the case of a respondent seeking to reopen her deportation to
apply for adjustment of status. "In order to tell whether Achacoso-Sanchez deserves
merciful treatment, one must know not only the facts of her case, but also the
circumstances of the tens of thousands of other aliens seeking relief. If the Board is
doing its job well, it is comparing the applicants against each other as well as
evaluating them under moral and prudential standards. That comparison entails the
assessment of thousands of aliens who are invisible to judges when a single alien seeks
judicial review. The nature of the comparison makes it unsuited for judicial
resolution." Id. at 1265.
260 Other courts have in the past drawn the distinction between review of extreme
hardship and the discretionary determination. See, e.g., Hernandez-Patino, 831 F.2d
750, 752 (7t- Cir. 1987). The court then distinguished itself from the earlier case ("the
application for suspension of deportation was denied for failure to satisfy statutory
eligibility requirements, and thus, our role is different from that of this Court in
Achacoso-Sanchez... which reviewed a BIA decision made on purely discretionary
grounds"). See also Banks v. INS, 594 F.2d 760, 762 (9t' Cir. 1979) (hardship findings
depend on the specific circumstances of the case); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 40
(1st Cir. 1993) (suspension of deportation "involves a two-step process: (1) a finding of
statutory eligibility; and (2) an exercise of agency discretion"). These courts
acknowledged the Board's unfettered authority to define extreme hardship, but
recognized the need to review the misapplication of relevant factors.
261 An interesting change in law may affect the significance of Kalaw. In support
of its opinion that extreme hardship findings are not reviewable, the Kalaw court
relied on language in the suspension of deportation statute, specifically that extreme
hardship is determined "in the opinion of the Attorney General." Kalaw v. INS, 133
F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1997). Yet, when Congress repealed INA §244, the statute
considered in Kalaw, and substituted relief under §240A(b), it eliminated the phrase.
Congress may have peeled off a layer of the agency's discretion for determining
hardship. Although the Wang court did not mention the "in the opinion of the
Attorney General" language, it is likely the court relied on the phrase to conclude
that the statute delegated to the Attorney General the discretion to determine
extreme hardship. Heyman, supra note 109, at 893.
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V. CASE STUDIES OF MEXICAN APPLICANTS
Immigrant domestic violence victims still face significant obstacles that
the Department of Justice has yet to address. Despite the rules, the
agency memorandum, and the centralization of adjudications of self-peti-
tions, there remains a lack of uniformity and consistency in the process.262
The situation of Mexican VAWA applicants is indicative of problems
attendant to extreme hardship as an eligibility standard for battered
immigrants. Mexican undocumented women hold a prominent place in
the United States immigrant community and represent a significant
number of the victims of violence seeking relief under VAWA. The out-
come of the struggle to define and shape extreme hardship for purposes
of VAWA cases will profoundly affect this group of women. A number of
issues relevant to extreme hardship are evident in the review of VAWA
cases involving Mexican battered women. The discussion in this section is
drawn from experiences of the students and faculty of St. Mary's Univer-
sity School of Law Immigration and Human Rights Clinics.26 First, there
is no need to incorporate an eligibility criterion tied to control of illegal
immigration to the VAWA eligible spouse and children who have come to
the United States lawfully or unlawfully. There is no evidence that
women and children have engaged in fraud to obtain VAWA benefits.264
On the other hand, extreme hardship determinations are an extraordi-
nary burden to both applicants and the INS. Battered women must col-
lect and present voluminous documentation, a process that complicates
and delays what should be a routine application process for them and for
the INS. Furthermore, the conflict between traditional and VAWA-cen-
tered extreme hardship determinations has led to disparate and
unfounded decisions in the cases of battered Mexican women. This
underscores the need for Congress to discard extreme hardship alto-
gether or for the agency to depart from its traditional interpretations rela-
tive to immigration benefits in order to guarantee the needs of all
battered immigrant women. Mexican spouses of U.S. citizens and legal
residents unable to meet a narrow standard of hardship face deportation
to a country that does not offer adequate legal protections. Congress
could not have intended that legislation aimed at curbing domestic vio-
lence would be implemented in a manner that jeopardizes the security
needs of battered immigrant women.
262 See discussion infra Section V, C.
263 The Clinics have assisted since 1995 over 100 Mexican women and children in
applying for benefits under the immigration provisions of VAWA.
264 Each of the Clinic's clients came with detailed accounts of battery and abuse,
and in many cases the violence had occurred over a substantial period of time. More
often than not, the women produced evidence of the abuse in police and medical
records and statements of neighbors, teachers, and relatives. See also Kelly, Stories
from the Front, supra note 11, at 688 ("Fear of fraud, however, is entirely misplaced.
Domestic violence is an underreported, not overreported, epidemic").
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A. Mexican Immigration and VAWA
Since the 1970s, Mexicans have led in the number of immigrants com-
ing to the United States have been Mexicans,265 and most new immi-
grants are women.266 Since 1997, over five thousand spouses and children
of U.S. citizens and legal residents have applied for VAWA benefits, 267
with a significant number of these applicants being Mexican women. 26 8
The figures illustrate the high profile of Mexican women in the general
immigrant population and in the pool of applicants seeking VAWA bene-
fits, and also indicates that regarding the overall population of family-
based immigration, VAWA applicants are a relatively small group. 269 It is
not known how many undocumented women, including Mexicans, are eli-
265 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATUARLIZATION SERVICE, 1995, at 30 (U.S.
Government Printing Office 1997) [hereinafter INS YEARBOOK]. In 1995, the total
population of Mexicans who immigrated to the United States was 90,045. The next
leading nation, Russia, sent 54,133. Id. Beginning in the early part of the century,
Mexicans began immigrating to the United States to work on the railroad and in
agriculture. AT THE CROSSROADS: MEXICO AND U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 3 (Frank
D. Bear, Rodolfo 0. De La Garza, Bryan R. Roberts, Signey Weintraub eds., 1997).
Until the 1970s, Mexican migration was relatively small in comparison to European
immigration. Id. But, with the increase in U.S. demand for low-skilled labor in the
agricultural and service industries, and the economic problems in Mexico, Mexican
immigrants, both illegal and legal grew. Id. at 8-9.
266 In 1995, women accounted for 56.9% of those Mexicans who immigrated. INS
YEARBOOK, supra note 265, at 56. Early Mexican migrants were predominantly male,
but as more Mexican men became legal residents there was a rise in female migration.
Katherine M. Donato, U.S. Policy and Mexican Migration to the United States, 1942-
92, 75 Soc. Sci. Q. 705, 714 (Dec. 1994). During the mid-1970s there began a steady
increase of undocumented women entering the United States, first as women joined
their families already in the U.S., and then due to the economic crisis in Mexico in the
1980s. Id. at 723-24. Also, cited for the increase in undocumented Mexican women in
their changing role in the Mexican family and greater independence. Tim Golden,
Evolving Roles of Mexican Women Evident in Rising Illegal Migration, AUSTIN
AMERICAN STATESMAN (July 26, 1992). See also Linda Miller Matthis, Gender and
International Labor Migration: A Network Approach, 1996 Soc. JUST. 38 (Sept. 1,
1996) (More women are coming on their own or with the help of female relatives and
friends, rather than spouses and other male relatives.).
267 INS report of adjudications for fiscal years 1997 and 1998. Memorandum from
Karen Fitzgerald, INS Office of Programs, Oct. 25, 1998, at 30 (on file with the
author).
268 Id. The INS does not record the country of origin of VAWA applicants, but
acknowledges that a substantial number are from Mexico and Central America.
269 VAWA applications account for a fraction of the total number of foreign
nationals who immigrate to the United States. In 1995, 458,482 individuals acquired
legal status based on family-based visas. INS YEARBOOK, supra note 265, at 46. Of
those, 83,893 were Mexican citizens. Id. at 47. Mexican VAWA applicants also
represent a small population within the larger group of undocumented immigrants. It
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gible to apply for VAWA. Given the high rate of domestic violence at all
levels of the United States population °2 7  a corresponding high rate of
VAWA applications would be expected. It may well be that most bat-
tered immigrant spouses and children, isolated from the general popula-
tion, remain unaware of the immigration provisions of VAWA.27 1 The
eligibility standard may be a useful and legitimate tool serving immigra-
tion enforcement goals but, appended to VAWA, it is a barrier which may
limit the number of women willing or able to apply and ultimately the
number who will gain resident status.
272
Mexican battered women must submit extensive documentation to sup-
port the claim of extreme hardship with each application they file. It is
common for the evidence submitted to support the extreme hardship
claim to substantially exceed evidence on other eligibility points. 3 The
task of preparing a VAWA petition is not only difficult and time-consum-
ing, it necessarily requires the assistance of legal counsel. Battered
spouses are generally unable to afford a private immigration attorney to
assist them, and there are few public interest organizations with the
expertise and staff to handle the cases.
27 4
Extreme hardship claims also present a burden to the agency. The INS
estimates that the majority of an officer's time spent adjudicating VAWA
is estimated that 2,700,000 out-of-status Mexicans reside in the United States. Id. at
183.
270 See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
271 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
272 It is quite possible, although undetermined (see supra note 80), that some
members of Congress, expecting large numbers of battered immigrants to apply for
VAWA, incorporated the factors of extreme hardship and good moral character in
order to limit the number of spouses and children who would ultimately gain legal
status. Placing such a barrier may be reasonable when considering legislation to
benefit the undocumented population in general. To impose such limitations on a
group which is eligible to immigrate is entirely unreasonable.
273 The length of a VAWA self-petition prepared by the St. Mary's clinics for its
Mexican clients can reach 250 pages. Most of the material is collected and organized
to support the women's extreme hardship arguments. Included, at a minimum, are
birth and immigration records of children and other family members in the United
States, school records of children, all available evidence of the applicant's residence in
the United States, detailed affidavits of friends, relatives, and other witnesses,
affidavits of psychologists, counselors, and of experts on Mexico, State Department
and human rights organization reports on conditions in Mexico, and other news
articles relating to domestic violence in Mexico.
274 For instance, in the San Antonio INS District, an area covering 81 South Texas
counties, there are only 39 members of the American Immigration Lawyers
Association (membership list on file with the author). There are also only four small
public interest organizations, including the St. Mary's clinics, available to handle
VAWA cases.
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self-petitions is devoted to reviewing evidence of hardship.275 There is no
administrative advantage to including extreme hardship as a standard of
eligibility, as there is no evidence that undocumented Mexican spouses
and children of U.S. citizens and legal residents are abusing VAWA 6 or
that VAWA is an ill-conceived magnet which attracts to the United States
undocumented individuals hoping to gain an immigration benefit.
B. Mexican Women Define Extreme Hardship
As Mexican VAWA applicants confront the issue of extreme hardship,
they press for a change from the traditional determination of the eligibil-
ity standard. Mexican VAWA applicants cite a number of reasons to sup-
port their belief that expulsion to their home country will result in an
extreme hardship to them and their immediate family. Applicants may
rely on some of the traditional factors often cited to support claims to
extreme hardship: family ties to U.S.-born or legal resident children, par-
ents and siblings; long-term residence in the United States; health con-
cerns; and ties to schools, churches, and other community organizations.
However, battered immigrants rely heavily on factors relevant to the
abuse that they and their children have suffered. Mexican VAWA appli-
cants, including those who lack extensive ties to family and to community
organizations in the United States, cite hardships they will face because
they have been victims of domestic violence. The following discussion
illustrates how the circumstances of Mexican battered women are appli-
cable to the six extreme hardship factors set forth in the preamble to the
interim rules and the Aleinikoff memorandum.
1. The Nature and Extent of Abuse
Mexican battered women applying for VAWA report a wide range of
physical and psychological abuse at the hands of their U.S. citizen and
legal resident spouses. They report they have been slapped, kicked, and
beaten. Some have been threatened with weapons, including guns and
knives, and some have suffered sexual abuse and rape.277 The women
275 Interview with Gail Pendleton of the National Immigrant Project of the
National Lawyers Guild. Ms. Pendleton has participated in the training of INS
officers assigned to the Vermont Service Center (notes on file with author).
276 Even if fraud were a problem, it likely would be detected in the review of
evidence of battery and extreme cruelty or good faith marriage.
277 In the case of Sara, she recounted the following incident:
One evening, my husband came home drunk and brought a friend home with
him. He demanded that I make dinner for them. When I told him we did not
have enough food, he hit me in the eye, grabbed me by the neck, sat me down
and put a gun to my neck. He threatened to kill me if I did not cook for them. I
cooked the little food we had for the children and fed it to them.
The stories of Mexican battered women are consistent with other victims of domestic
violence who may report serious physical trauma caused by beatings and weapon
attacks. C. P. EwiNG, BATrERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-
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commonly report that the abuse began with name-calling and then esca-
lated into more severe physical violence.278 Women recount that their
spouses are often possessive and jealous and will isolate the women from
friends and family.279 Abusive spouses frequently denigrate their Mexi-
can wives because they are undocumented, threaten to call the INS to
have the women deported and boast that they will bar the women from
their children.28 °
2. Access to United States Court and Criminal Justice System.
Mexican battered women fear the loss of those protections afforded to
them in the United States. They fear that deportation will result in the
loss of access to courts that are able to protect them against continuing
violence and provide them with redress for child custody and support.
Mexican domestic violence victims find in the United States, notably in
California, Texas, and Illinois, the states to which Mexicans are most
likely to immigrate,28 1 criminal justice systems able to provide them with
broad legal protection and services.282 Each state defines domestic vio-
lence to encompass a wide range of abuses against a spouse, former
DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 8 (1987). Studies estimate that 22% to 35% of
women attended at hospital emergency rooms had sustained injuries due to domestic
violence. T. Randall, Domestic Violence Intervention Calls for More than Treating
Injuries, 264:8 J. Am. MED. ASS'N 939-40 (Aug. 22/29, 1990).
278 The women report that during courtship they were treated well, but that the
abuse began usually after marriage. Name-calling is often the first sign of abuse that
gradually escalates into more serious physical violence. This is a typical pattern of
abusive relationships. See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 42,
105-106 (1987). Domestic violence often consists of chronic and repeated physical
and emotional abuse. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 36. Over time the abuse often
becomes more severe. See id. at 37
279 This behavior also is consistent with typical battery and abuse situations.
BROWNE, supra note 278, at 42.
280 See Klein & Orloff, Providing Legal Protection to Battered Women, supra note
37. In one case handled by the clinic, that of Susana, her husband aggressively sought
her deportation. He obtained custody of the couple's two small children, and in an
effort to have her removed to Mexico, contacted the INS. When she was arrested and
placed in deportation proceedings, he then appeared at the immigration court to press
for her deportation. Notes on fie with the author.
281 INS Yearbook, supra note 265, at 63.
282 See Klein & Orloff, supra note 37, for analysis of state statues in the United
States which respong to domestic violence. See also Billy G. Mills & Mary Lyons
McNamara, California's Response to Domestic Violence, 21 SANTA CLARA L. Rnv. 6
(1981); Review of Selected 1994 California Legislation, 26 PAC. L. J. 202, 380, 382, 475-
476 (1995) (California); Sheila M. Murphy, Orders of Protection and the Battered
Women Syndrome, Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 397 (1992) (Illinois); Steve Russell, The Futility
of Eloquence: Selected Texas Family Violence Legislation 1979-1991, 33 S. TX. L. REv.
353 (1992) (Texas). See also Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1852 (1993)
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spouse, and other co-habitants.2 83 The legislatures in California, Illinois
and Texas have demonstrated recognition of the gravity of domestic vio-
lence. Each has passed comprehensive measures for the issuance of
enforceable protective orders to guarantee the safety of battered women
and their families in and out of the home,284 provided criminal sanctions
for domestic violence,285 and mandated police interventions and assist-
ance to victims.
28 6
VAWA represents a federal response to domestic violence statute.
Besides the immigration provisions, VAWA contains other provisions to
combat domestic violence. VAWA authorizes the interstate enforcement
(over the past twenty years, there has been substantial progress in the development of
legal remedies for domestic violence victims in the United States).
283 California defines abuse as "intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to
cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable apprehension of
imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself, or another. CALIFORNIA ANN.
STAT., PENAL CODE 13700(a). The Illinois Domestic Violence Act defines abuse as
"physical abuse, harassment, intimidation of a dependent, interference with personal
liberty , or willful deprivation. ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 750 §60/103(1) (Smith & Hurd,
1993). Harassment includes conduct that creates a disturbance at employment, in
school, repeated telephone calls, repeated following, and keeping one under
surveillance. Id. at § 601.103(1).
In Texas, family violence is defined as "an act... that is intended to result in
physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or is a threat that reasonably
places the member in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual
assault.. ." VERNON'S TEXAS ANN. STAT., §71.01(2).
28 See also CALIFORNIA ANN. STAT. FAMILY CODE §§ 6240 et. seq. In California
judicial officers are authorized to issue emergency protective order valid up to seven
days. §6257. Permanent orders are valid up to three years. §6345. See also ILLINOIS
ANN. STAT. CH. 750 §60/210 et seq. (blue book prohibits use of et seq. When citing
consecutive sections or subsections R 3.4) (Smith & Hurd). Emergency orders in
Illinois may last up to 21 days and plenary orders are valid for up to two years. §60/
220. See also VERNON'S ANN. TEXAS STATuES, FAMmY CODE §71.01 et seq. (In
Texas an abused spouse may obtain a protective order valid up to one year.)
285 It is a crime in each state not only to commit assaults on domestic partners, but
also to violate protective orders. CALIF. ANN. STAT., PENAL CODE §273.6; ILLINOIS
ANN. STAT. CH. 720, §5/12-30 (Smith-Hurd); VERNON'S ANN. STAT. PENAL CODE
§25.07. In Illinois it is also a crime to interfere with the reporting of domestic
violence, ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 720 §5/12-6.3, and in California the malicious disclosure
of the location of a domestic violence shelter is an offense. CALIF. ANN. STAT.,
PENAL CODE §273.7.
286 For example, the California Penal Code requires law enforcement department
develop and implement policies for response to domestic violence calls. CALIF. ANN.
STAT., PENAL CODE §13701. Section 13519 of the California Penal Code provides for
a course of instruction for police officers to aid in handling domestic violence
complaints. Under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act, law enforcement officers are
required to use all reasonable means to prevent abuse, including transportation to a
shelter for the victim, medical assistance if needed, or accompanying the victim to
retrieve belongings. Smith & Hurd, ILL. ANN. STAT., CH. 750 §60/304.
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of protection orders,287 establishes a federal offense for crossing state
lines to harass or intimidate a partner,288 provides grants to states for
training of police,28 9 and creates a civil rights claim for gender-motivated
crimes.29° While domestic violence remains a serious problem in the
United States,29' Mexican women in abusive relationships in this country
enjoy a greater measure of protection than they would if they were
returned to Mexico.
3. Need for Services
Attendant to legal protections offered by the United States criminal
justice system are the social services that offer protection and psychologi-
cal counseling to Mexican battered women and their families. Shelters
for battered women are found throughout the United States, including in
the states of California, Texas, and Illinois.292 Also available for battered
women are psychological services at the shelters or in schools that their
children attend. There are now many agencies in the United States that
are reaching out to serve immigrant women.293 Many Mexican VAWA
287 18 U.S.C. §2265 (1997).
288 18 U.S.C. §2261 (1997).
289 42 U.S.C. §3796hh (1997).
290 42 U.S.C. §13981 (1995).
291 Domestic violence is still a major cause of injury to women in the United
States. Pamela Goldberg & Nancy Kelley, Recent Developments: International
Human Rights and Violence Against Women, 6 HARv. H.R.J. 195 (1993). Despite
decades in the development of substantive legal remedies and social services, there
still exist serious shortcomings in the delivery of legal protection to victims of
violence, and in many areas, U.S. criminal justice systems have yet to meet the needs
of non-white and poor women. Kimberly Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra
note 37, at 1250 (1991). See also Katherine Culliton, Legal Remedies for Domestic
Violence in Chile and the United States: Cultural Relativism, Myths, and Realities, 26
CAsE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 183, 187-89 (Latina women often face difficulties accessing
protection and services in the United States because police and social workers tend to
blame the Latino culture for domestic problems). However, despite the recurring
problems surrounding family violence in the United States and deficiencies in our
criminal justice systems, Mexico still lags behind the United States in terms of the
legal and social resources available to combat domestic violence. See Section 4 infra.
Moreover, it is Mexican women applying for VAWA who readily identify the
shortcomings in the Mexican systems as a problem. Id.
292 California and Illinois have passed legislation to provide grants for battered
women's shelters. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §300.5(b); ILL. ANN. STAT. CH.
20, para. 2210 (Smith & Hurd 1998).
293 There are agencies in the United States devoted to serving battered immigrant
women. Notably, AYUDA in Washington, D.C., the Asian Pacific Island Family
Safety Center in Seattle, and Mujeres Unidas y Accion in San Francisco are a few of
the organizations specifically set up to serve battered immigrants. See Girardo-Roy,
supra note 47, at 286-87. Public interest legal organizations have established projects
to assist battered women, including immigrants. See Virginia Martinez, Chicanas and
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applicants depend on U.S. social service agencies. The women's state-
ments supporting their VAWA applications state that they have become
dependent on shelters and the counseling services in which they and their
children are enrolled. Applicants fear that deportation will break the few
ties they do have to needed social and health services.
4. Conditions Abroad
Mexican women applying for immigrant status in the United States
fear deportation to Mexico because the country has failed to construct
adequate legal protections for victims of domestic violence. They recount
the difficulties they had in obtaining protection prior to coming to the
United States when they lived in their country with their spouses. 294
They also are aware that the proximity of Mexico to the United States
increases the threat that their batterer, who persists in the abuse, will be
able to carry out continued violence. Mexican women's concern for their
protection and that of their children is central to their efforts to avoid
deportation and obtain legal status in the U.S. Mexico's lack of a support
network and a legal structure to aid victims of domestic violence should
weigh heavily in extreme hardship determinations.295
the Law 136-137, in LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES (Antoinette Sedillo Lopez
ed.,1995) (explaining that the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund
(MALDEF) established its Chicana Rights Project in part to address problems of
battered women.) In many local communities in states in which most immigrants
reside, service centers and shelters have set up Spanish language hotlines and hired
bilingual staff. See Claudia Diaz Olavarrieta & Julio Sotelo, Domestic Violence in
Mexico, 96 JAMA 1937 (June 26, 1996). In an effort to reach out to battered
immigrant women and children, VAWA allocates funds specifically for service to
immigrants and other marginalized groups. 42 U.S.C. §§10416-18.
294 In one case, that of Marta, she testified that her husband once beat her and
threw her out of their home in Mexico; she was forced to spend the night sleeping
with their animals. She called the police, who persuaded her husband to let her see
her children, but refused to provide assistance with regard to the abuse. Notes on file
with the author.
295 In their efforts to represent battered Mexican women, students and faculty of
the St. Mary's Clinics have interviewed and obtained statements from Mexican
attorneys, analyzed Mexico's civil and criminal codes, and collected human rights
reports and news articles relating to Mexico's response to domestic violence. The
experts consulted include Lic. Roberto Rosas, a Mexican attorney and law professor
at St. Mary's University, Lic. Patricia Begne, a family law expert who teaches law at
the Universidad de Guanajuato, Lic. Marta Silvia Briones Cardena, attorney with the
Centro de Atencion de Victimas de Delitos in Monterrey, N.L., Mexico, and Lic.
Teresa Ulloa, an attorney with the Mexicana de Defensa y Promocion de los
Derechos (C.M. .D.P.D.H.) in Mexico, D.F. The information and materials collected
have been used to support the claims of extreme hardship for the Clinics' clients and
have been distributed to other domestic violence advocates in a manual Legal
Remedies for Battered Mexican Immigrants (on file with the author).
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Domestic violence in Mexico is a serious national problem, considered
"widespread and vastly underreported., 296 The few surveys that have
been conducted conclude that violence in Mexican families is a problem
faced by every generation and members of every social, economic, and
educational group,297 in both rural and industrial areas. Most commenta-
tors agree that at a minimum, states should provide victims of domestic
violence the following: 1) access to emergency shelters; 2) civil and crimi-
nal laws which address domestic violence, including provisions for
enforceable protective orders; and 3) effective response by law enforce-
ment to victims of violence.298 Mexico only has recently begun to build
legal and social systems with which to control the domestic violence
296 U.S. State Department Country Report, Mexico: Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 1998, at 19 (Feb. 26, 1999) [hereinafter State Dept. Report]. Few
studies have tracked the level and nature of domestic violence in Mexico, but those
that do report alarming rates. Carlos Montes de Oca Estradas, Atenci6n y Prevenci6n
de la Violencia Domistica: Una Propuesta Juridica, in FORo ESTATAL SoBE LA
FAMiLLA MEMORiAS 195 (1993). See also NAOMI NEFT & ANN LEvINE, WHERE
WOMEN STAND: AN INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN 140
COUNTRIES (1997).
297 See Rolando Cordera Campos, Notas en Torno a la Violencia en la Familia, EL
NAcIONAL, Nov. 1, 1996. The majority of victims of domestic violence are women.
Esperanza Barajas, Chuayffet propone mds educaci6n para abatir la violencia
intrafamiliar, EL EXCELSIOR, Oct. 29, 1996 (reporting that during the first six
months of 1995, 90% of the victims were women and 87% of the aggressors were
men.). In a survey of 342 low and middle income women, aged 15 or older, in Mexico
City, 33% were reported to have lived in a violent relationship. Lori Heise, Jacqueline
Pitanguy & Adrienne Germani, Violence Against Women, the Hidden Health Problem,
WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS, at 8. See also Olavarrieta & Sotelo, supra
note 293. (citing Ramirez J. and Vdsquez G., Mujer y Violencia: un Hecho Cotidiano
Salud Publica Mex.1993, 35:148-160). In 1995, the Asociacion Mexicana contra la
Violencia Hacfa las Mujeres, A.C. (COVAC), one of Mexico's leading advocates for
domestic violence victims, in collaboration with the United Nations Population Fund
and the Attorney General of the Federal District, issued a report in which it was
found that 35% of those interviewed knew of a family member who had suffered
some form of violence in the previous six months. See COVAC study on file with the
author.
298 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS, supra note 297. However, it must be
recognized that even when states do provide the minimum in terms of shelters, civil
and criminal laws addressing family violence, and law enforcement response,
domestic violence persists as a serious problem. More appropriately, these minimum
measures should be seen as first steps and that only when states follow up with
comprehensive efforts to engage police, courts, and social service agencies in dealing
with the dynamics of the battering relationship and the persistence of batterers will
there be systemic change. See David Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The
Use of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1153, 1176-78 (1995).
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plaguing the country and, therefore, does not provide sufficient protec-
tion and services to battered women.299
Mexico's civil and criminal codes remain antiquated and cumbersome
and inadequate to meet the needs of domestic violence victims. With the
exception of recent legislative changes to the codes in the Federal Dis-
trict, 0 0 most Mexican codes fail to address domestic violence.30 ' Fur-
thermore, the country lacks adequate police response and social services
to respond to the needs of victims and their families.3 0 2
299 Critique of the Mexican response to domestic violence does not suggest that
only the United States has developed successful models to combat domestic violence.
Some United States advocates hold such a view. See Culliton, Legal Remedies for
Domestic Violence in Chile and the United States, supra note 291 (Latin American
countries are developing models that are distinct, but effective). Judgment of the
Mexican legal system does not reflect a notion that Mexico has all the problems and
North Americans have all the answers. Id. at 197.
Women's groups in Mexico have long struggled to call attention to the problems
women face, including the plight of victims of domestic violence. See Suzie Siegel,
Mexican Women Work for Progress, TAMPA TR. (Mar. 8, 1996). As in the United
States and Europe, the women's movement in Mexico formed in the 1970s, and
organized around the issues of abortion, rape, and domestic violence. Eli Barton, The
Struggle for Life, or Pulling Off the Mask of Infamy, in WOMEN AND POLITICS
WORLDWIDE 451 (Barbara Nelson & Najma Chowdhury eds., 1994). Women's
advocates have called for battered women's shelters, increased criminal enforcement,
broad public education campaigns, and changes to civil and criminal codes. Rolando
Cordera Campos, Notas en Torno a la Violencia en la Familia, supra note 297;
Gabriela Romero Sanchez, Tipificar como Delito la Violencia Intrafamiliar,
Demandan Grupos, NOVEDADES, Oct. 26, 1996, at 132. However, it is only recently
that efforts to force public response to domestic violence have had some measure of
success.
300 See infra notes 326 and 327 and accompanying text (describing the legislation).
301 Comments of Lic. Patricia Begne, Lic. Roberto Rosas, and Lic. Teresa Ulloa.
See supra note 295 and discussion, infra, Sections a and b. However, while the
Mexican states lag behind Mexico, D.F. in terms of legal protections for victims of
domestic violence, some state legislators are considering code changes. See Miguel
Dominguez, Apreuban Ley Intrafamiliar, REFORMA (June 9, 1999) (State of
Tamaulipas); Andrea Medfna Rosas, Mujeres y Hombres, Vocas Unidos (February 21,
1995) (State of Jalisco); Rosaura Barahora, Y la Violdncia Intrafamiliar? (Nuevo
Leon).
302 See, e.g., U.S. State Dept. Report at 20:
Women are reluctant to report abuse or file charges, and even when notified,
the police are reluctant to intervene in what society considers to be a domestic
matter. Police are also inexperienced in these cases and unfamiliar with
appropriate investigative technologies.
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a. Civil laws
Mexico only has recently begun exploring changes to its civil laws to
respond to the problem of domestic violence.3" 3 Outside the Federal Dis-
trict, the civil codes in Mexico fail to provide specific substantive relief.
304 Consequently, remedies for abused women are confined to proce-
dures for separation and divorce. 0 5 Divorce in Mexico must be based on
one or more grounds listed in the Mexican codes that the petitioning
party has the burden of proving and, even in an abusive situation, divorce
proceedings are lengthy and unwieldy. 3 6 Furthermore, and most impor-
303 See discussion, infra, Section C on reform movement in Mexico. Despite recent
proposals for changes in Mexico, D.F., civil protections for domestic violence victims
have yet to be enforced. See infra notes 326-327 and accompanying text.
304 However, the Mexican states may soon incorporate the changes made in the
Federal District to their own codes. Mexico is a civil law country; the Codes of the 31
Mexican states and the Federal District govern all civil and criminal matters. With
few exceptions, the 31 Mexican states had adopted or closely follow the civil and
criminal codes of the Federal District. Paul Bernstein El Derecho y El Hecho: Law
and Reality in the Mexican Criminal Justice System, 8 CHIcANo L. REv. 40, 44 (1985).
Court decisions are primarily an analysis of code provisions. Margarita Trevino Bulli
& David Coale, Torts and Divorce: A Comparison of Texas and the Mexican Federal
District, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 29, 42 (Fall 1995).
305 Divorce proceedings became legal in Mexico in 1931, but it was not until 1974
that women were granted equal rights in seeking separation and divorce. Neft and
Levine, supra note 296, at 358. A woman may obtain an uncontested divorce,
divorcio voluntario (por mutuo consentimiento), but only if there is an agreement
from both parties. Interview with Lic. Roberto Rosas. See also Artfculo 272, C6digo
Civil para el Distrito Federal (C.C.D.F.), art. 272 (Mex.). If a woman is unable to
obtain such an agreement for divorce, she must resort to filing a contested lawsuit,
divorcio necesario (contencioso). Interview with Lic. Roberto Rosas; See Artfculo 267,
C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal (C.C.D.F.), art. 267 (Mex.). See also Julian
Guitron, Mexico: A Decade of Family Law, 1983-1993, 33 Univ. Louisville J. Fain. L.
445 (1994-95).
306 There are a number of grounds for divorce listed in the Mexican codes,
including adultery, a husband's prostitution of his wife, chronic or incurable illnesses,
mental illness, and abandonment of home without cause. Artfculo 267, C6digo Civil
para el Distrito Federal (C.C.D.F.), art. 267 (Mex.). One ground, sevicia (extreme
cruelty), is tied to domestic violence. Id. at XI. Art. 267 has been amended to include
additional domestic violence-related grounds. However, outside the Federal District,
the petitioning party in a Mexican divorce carries a heavy burden in proving a case,
even in establishing sufficient cruelty for a divorce. The civil code provides that
extreme cruelty, threats, and grave injuries upon one party may justify a divorce, but
only if the situation has made living together intolerable. See CODIGO CIVIL PARA EL
DIsTRrro FEDERAL, COMENTADO, VOL. 1 AT 195 (1990). See also Guitr6n, supra note
305, at 458. A Supreme Court Jurisprudencia, a case of legal precedent, illustrates the
difficulties in obtaining divorce based on cruelty and violence. "Extreme cruelty must
be such that marital union cannot be endured and is not based on a simple argument
or an isolated beating that can be tolerated." J6sus Enrique Pantoja Mercado,
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tantly, Mexican law does not generally provide for enforceable orders of




In Mexico, victims of domestic violence may request criminal prosecu-
tion of their abuser, but enforcement is inadequate and unless the victim
sustains serious physical injury, prosecution is unlikely. 08 Domestic vio-
lence victims in Mexico are reluctant to file criminal charges against their
abuser,309 and in those situations in which charges are leveled, the author-
ities will either fail to act or fail to adequately protect the victim.
3 10
Adici6n a la Fracci6n XI de Articulo 323 del C6digo Civil Vigente en el de Estado
Guanajuato, FORO ESTATAL SOBRE LA FAMILIA MEMORIAS 87 (1993).
Under Mexican law, there is clear support for preservation of the family and
disfavor of divorce. There are few jurisdictions that provide for a no-fault divorce,
and even then the provisions are ineffective for battered women because the codes
require a two year separation before a no-fault divorce can be filed. ARTCULO 267,
§XVIII, CODIGO CIVIL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL. Family interests are also
reflected in the Mexican Constitution. Article 4 of the Constitution assures the
protection of the family, although interestingly, the provision follows the declaration
that men and women are to be treated equally. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS
EsTADos UNIDOS MEXICANAS, TrLE I, ART. 4. See also Antoinette Sedillo Lopez,
Two Legal Constructs of Motherhood: "Protective" Legislation in Mexico and the
United States, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. 7 WOMEN'S STUD. 239, 243 (1992).
307 See Klein and Orloff, supra note 37, at 811 and Donald Dutton, THE DOMESTIC
ASSAULT OF WOMEN:PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 234
(1995). Code changes in Mexico, D.F. provide a limited protection order. See infra
note 237. Outside Mexico, D.F., the only comparable remedy in Mexico is the
separation order, separaci6n de personas, which is tied to the divorce proceedings and
thus, is available only for married women. Interview with Lic. Roberto Rosas.
Separation orders are obtained in a family court and may permit a woman and her
children to occupy the family home. They remain valid for short periods of time, and
only during the pendancy of a divorce. See ARTICULOS 525-535, CODIGO CIVIL DE
PROCEDIMIENTOS CIVILES DEL ESTADO DE MEXICO. (The party may apply for an
order providing for occupancy of the home and child support. The order is valid for 15
days but will be voided if the party does not pursue a divorce). The codes do not
provide for any civil or criminal sanctions if a separation order is violated. Interview
with Lic. Roberto Rosas.
308 Interview with Lic. Marta Silvia Briones Cardenas, Attorney for Centro de
Atenci6n a Victimas de Belitos, June 7, 1997 (notes on file with the author).
309 U.S. State Department Report, supra note 296. See also COVAC Study, infra
note 297.
310 See U.S. State Department Report, supra note 296 and COVAC Study, supra
note 297. See also Olavarrieta and Sotelo, supra note 293 (Judicial authorities refuse
to act because they view domestic violence as a private matter, not one of public
concern).
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As with the civil codes, Mexican criminal code provisions outside the
Federal District do not specifically protect domestic violence victims.
311
Physical abuse by a spouse is generally considered a minor offense, and
criminal prosecution usually will result only in cases in which a woman
can prove she has sustained serious and visible bodily injury (lesion), or a
credible threat to her life.312 A victim is not only burdened with having
to go to extraordinary lengths to demonstrate she has suffered a signifi-
cant injury, but also she must identify her abuser and establish a motive.
313 Moreover, the criminal codes do not provide for enforceable no con-
tact orders which would provide some protection for women while
charges are pending. 1 4 This is a further barrier to women, who often
forego filing charges when they are unable to obtain protection.
3 15
The criminal justice system is also viewed as unsympathetic to domestic
violence victims, particularly those who are poor.311 Police protection in
Mexico is woefully inadequate to protect victims of family violence, and
most Mexican citizens still view the police as corrupt and incompetent.
317
Furthermore, surveys indicate that less than half of the criminal com-
plaints are prosecuted.318 The serious shortcomings of the Mexican crimi-
311 Only the Federal District's criminal code contains provisions specific for
domestic violence victims, but there have been no reported prosecutions. See infra
section c.
312 Prosecution is declined unless the victim suffered a serious injury, lesion, which
requires more than 15 days to heal, and which can be verified with a medical
certificate. Patricia Begne, La Mujer en Mixico, 83 (1990). See also Interview with
Lie. Marta Silvia Briones Cardenas, attorney for Centro de Atenci6n a Vfctimas de
Delitos, June 7, 1997. Notes on file with the author.
313 See Olavarrieta and Sotelo, infra note 293. The Mexican court will not
ordinarily accept uncorroborated testimony, and the victim must therefore produce
witnesses. Id.
314 See Statements of Lie. Roberto Rosas, Lie. Teresa Ulloa, and Lie. Patricia
Begne, supra note 295.
315 COVAC Study, supra note 297 at 53. Most domestic violence victims refuse to
press charges against their abuser out of fear they will be subjected to added violence
or abuse. Id.
316 Olavarietta and Sotelo, supra note 293; Bernstein, supra note 304, at 48.
317 STATE DEPT. REPORT, supra note 302. Statement of Lie. Teresa Ulloa, supra
note 295.
318 See COVAC Study, supra note 297. In 60% of family violence cases in which
prosecution was unsuccessful, the authorities had failed to act. Id. at 56. In only 32%
of the cases in which prosecution was viewed as successful was the abuser jailed, and
then only for a few hours. Id. at 55.
In the United States, there is, as in Mexico, a high rate of unreported incidents of
domestic violence. It is estimated that 30% of victims in the United States report
abuse. See S. REP. No. 103-138 (1993). However, it is more likely in the United
States that a complaint will be aggressively prosecuted. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right
to Choose, supra note 283 at 1852-1853; Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to
Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1498 at 1514-27 (1993). See also Rice, supra
68 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1
nal justice system result in little protection to victims and allow abusers to
batter with impunity.319
Access to shelters and advocacy centers and service agencies are essen-
tial to the protection of battered and abused women. Unfortunately,
there is a dearth of emergency shelters available for Mexican women flee-
ing a violent home. In many urban areas, there are shelters for children
who have been abandoned or abused, but few facilities have been estab-
lished specifically for battered women.32 °
There are few governmental and non-governmental agencies that pro-
vide services specifically to women victims of violence. Non-governmen-
tal agencies remain centered in a few state capitals, 321 and frequently face
funding shortages that severely limit their outreach and effectiveness.322
New government-sponsored agencies that are centered in a few urban
centers are organized to provide assistance to all crime victims, not just
battered women, and also lack sufficient resources to attend to all the
domestic violence victims who need services.323 Moreover, few of the
note 278 and interview with Lic. Teresa Ulloa, supra note 295. Furthermore, the
dockets in Mexican criminal courts are overcrowded and prosecutions frequently
exceed a year. Margarita Trevino Balli & David Coale, Torts and Divorce: A
Comparison of Texas and the Mexican Federal District, 11 CONN J. INT'L L. 29, 51 (Fall
1995). See also Teresa Rice, A Third of Mexican Women are Victims of Domestic
Abuse, NOTIMEX, April 14, 1992 at 94.
319 In one example which demonstrates the problems with Mexico's criminal
justice system, a young law student who had been repeatedly abused by her former
boyfriend was later jailed and charged with murder when she mortally injured the
boyfriend while trying to defend herself. Norma Garza, Perspectiva, Caso de pagina
roja, EL NORTE, Jan. 14, 1990. The woman had on two occasions tried to lodge
criminal charges against the boyfriend, but because she could not prove a serious
injury, her charges were ignored by prosecutors.
320 Even in Mexico City, the "most heavily populated city in the world," there are
few shelter facilities devoted to battered women. See Olavarrieta and Sotelo, supra
note 293. One shelter located in a working class suburb far from the metropolitan
area requires a woman demonstrate she is filing a legal action against her partner. Id.
See also interview with Lic. Teresa Ulloa, supra note 295.
321 Rice, supra note 318. Non-governmental agencies, such as COVAC which
provide legal and psychological counseling to battered women, are located only in
some state capitals, out of reach to suburban and rural areas of the country.
322 Id. at 3.
323 Mexico's serious economic problems cannot be ignored and, at some level,
account for the government's inability to deal effectively with the problem of
domestic law. Funding for services to domestic violence victims must complete with
public funds for other health and social problems, such as alcoholism, diseases, and
malnutrition. See Olavarrieta and Sotelo, infra note 318. The Attorney General's
Centro de Atenci6n a Vfctimas Intrafamiliar (CAVI), a victims' advocacy unit, was
the first government-sponsored office organized to deal with domestic violence. See
Teresa Rice, supra note 268. It offers psychological and legal counseling and
prevention workshops. See also Olavarrieta and Sotel, supra note 293. CAVI does
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Women's groups in Mexico have focused attention on the problem of
domestic violence, and through their efforts, studies have been generated,
government initiatives to serve victims have surfaced, and legislative pro-
posals have been debated.325 Two pieces of legislation were recently
passed in the Federal District, one to establish centers for attention to
victims of domestic violence,326 and the other to revamp the civil and
criminal codes to address the problem.327 However, there has been lack
of enforcement of these reform measures,3 28 a signal that the Mexican
not have sufficient staff to handle the large number of requests for services. See
statement of Lic. Teresa Ulloa, supra note 295.
The Mexican government sponsores child welfare agencies, Desarollo Ingegral de
la Familia (DIF), but until recently DIF offices did not address the specific problems
of battered women. Interview with Maria de la Luz Garza, Director of the Centro de
Atenci6n Psicol6gca Casa de la Mujer in San Pedro Garza Garcfa, Nuevo Ldon,
M6xico (June 6, 1997). The center she directs is a branch of DIF and in 1990 began to
provide services to rape victims. However, in many areas, DIF offices are considered
poor advocates and insensitive to the plight of battered women. See Francisco Mejia,
Muere un Nino cada dos Dias, Victima de la Violencia Familiar en Mixico,
INOLATINA, Oct. 30, 1996.
324 See Statement of Lic. Teresa Ulloa., supra note 295.
325 See supra note 297.
326 LEY DE ASISTENCIA Y PRBVENCION DE LA VfOLENCIA INTRAFAMILLIAR DEL
D.F. (on file with the author). The measure authorized the establishment of centers
organized to receive and process complaints of domestic violence, summon parties
involved, resolve disputes through mediation and arbitration, and provide
psychological assistance.
327 In November 1997, the President of Mexico and a majority of federal legislators
initiated amendments to the Mexico D.F. Civil Code, Civil Procedure Code, Penal
Code, and Criminal Procedure Code. The amendments were publicized December
30, 1997 in the Official Federal Register. Included in the changes was the provision
for no contact protective orders at the filing of a divorce, before the divorce if there is
an emergency, but only during the proceedings. ARTfCULO 282, C6DIGO CrVIL PARA
EL DisTRicro FEDERAL (C.C.D.F.) ARTICULO 282 (MFx.). The Federal District code
also now defines domestic violence. ARTfCULO 323 TER, CODIGO CIVIL PARA EL
DisTrro FEDERAL (C.C.D.F.), ARTICULO 323 ter (Mex). The amendments are made
only to the Mexico D.F. codes, and not to other state codes. See also State
Department Report, supra note 296.
328 See STATE DEp-r. REPORT, supra note 296 at 20, and Interview of Lic. Teresa
Ulloa and of Lic. Patricia Begne, see supra note 295. The government does not have
the resources to open offices to attend to family violence cases. Moreover, even
though changes have been made to the codes in Mexico, there has been no
corresponding training of police, prosecutors, and judges to ensure that the laws will
be enforced. Lic. Ulloa reported that in July 1998 no protection orders had been
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government is unprepared to institute major changes to aid victims of
domestic violence. 29
Without aggressive measures to end domestic violence and provide
protection to its victims, Mexico cannot provide a safe haven to Mexican
women caught in abusive relationships in the United States. If forced to
return to Mexico, these women face archaic civil laws designed to dis-
courage divorce, criminal codes which punish only the most grievous inju-
ries, and untrained, understaffed, and unsympathetic law enforcement.
d. Behavior of the Abuser
As indicated in the discussion on the conditions for battered women in
Mexico, women fear their abusive spouses will follow them to Mexico,
and because of the proximity of Mexico to the United States, their fears
are justified. 330
Mexican women often state that returning to Mexico is not an escape
alternative because their spouses threaten to follow them abroad. The
women report that their abusive spouses, particularly those who are Mex-
ican citizens, frequently travel to Mexico and know well the country and
the location of the women's families.33' Even when the abuser is a
United States citizen, the spouse may fear he will follow and harass her.
In a case involving a Mexican woman, the abusive husband was a bounty
hunter who boasted he had traveled often to Mexico on business and
could find her if she fled to that country."3 2
issued by the Federal District Superior Court, and there were no reports of any
convictions against batterers in Mexico, D.F. The failure to implement the domestic
violence legislation is consistent with past omissions. While Mexico has passed
commendable human rights legislation, its legal system is exceedingly slow and the
government has failed to enforce new laws and protections. See Mexico: A Country
Guide 67 (Tom Burns, ed., 1991).
329 Perhaps in recognition of shortcomings of the new legislation, the President of
the Human Rights Commission of the Federal District, Luis de Ta Barreda Sol6rzano,
was quoted as saying that the Ley de Asistencia was a point of departure and an
educational tool. Maria Luisa Perez, Buscar educar contra violencia familiar,
REFORMA, July 26, 1996.
330 See discussion supra Section 4.
331 See supra note 1 for stories of Sara and Elena. In both cases the abusive
spouses had ties to Mexico and frequently traveled to that country. See also case of
Marta, discussed at supra note 294.
332 Case of Susana whose husband possessed an arsenal of weapons and
threatened to kill Susana if she took their children to Mexico (notes on file with the
author). It is not uncommon to find among clinic clients who live in proximity to the
U.S./Mexico border, who have U.S. citizen spouses make credible threats to follow
their victims to Mexico.
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e. Potential Harm from Abusive Family, Friends
Because the abusers often have strong ties to Mexico, many women
report they fear retaliation from the abusive spouse's family and friends.
The women feel vulnerable to continued abuse at the hands of family or
friends who are angered by action the women may have taken, such as
reporting the spouse to the police and obtaining protection and child cus-
tody orders. One woman produced letters from her incarcerated spouse
threatening to have her killed in Mexico.
333
C. INS Response to Mexican Applicants
The INS centralization of VAWA self-petition adjudication in one ser-
vice center with officials trained specifically to adjudicate these claims has
contributed to a high rate of approval of self-petitions, including those of
battered Mexican women.3 34 It is evident that the six factors incorpo-
rated in the preamble to the interim rules and the Aleinikoff Memoran-
dum play a significant, if not determinative, role in extreme hardship
determinations at the INS service center.335
This positive development is overshadowed by the fact that for many
battered Mexican women, their efforts to gain legal status are under-
mined by extreme hardship traditionalists within the agency. Within INS
district offices handling VAWA cases, one finds that factually-similar
cases of Mexican women receive disparate treatment, 336 and individual
33 See Case of Consuelo. Her spouse was jailed for a drug offense, but wrote
threatening letters to Consuelo from prison. Case notes on file with the author.
334 See Memorandum of Karen Fitzgerald, Office of Programs, October 25, 1998,
supra note 268. The accompanying report indicates that in fiscal year 1997, 2,491
VAWA petitions were received by the INS; 1,210 were approved and 406 were denied.
In 1998, the INS received 3,331 VAWA petitions, approved 1,677 and denied 810. The
report does not indicate the reason(s) for denial of petitions except that some
applicants failed to prove eligibility and some abandoned their application. The
report does not indicate the number of approved VAWA petitions later revoked by
local INS officers. See infra note 337.
335 Gail Pendleton of the National Immigration Project reports that adjudicators at
the Vermont Service Center assign greater importance to the six domestic violence-
related factors than to the traditional factors. In fact, if an applicant were to rely
solely on the traditional Anderson factors and not detail hardship tied to abuse, the
Vermont adjudicators suspect fraud. Interview with Gail Pendleton, notes on fie with
the author. See also Gilbert, supra note 72.
336 The case of Sara, supra note 1, and that of another Mexican woman, Marta,
supra note 294, illustrate this point. Both women were married to permanent
residents and both had suffered serious abuse of many years at the hands of their
spouses. Marta had been hit, slapped and kicked, subjected to verbal abuse, and
threatened with weapons by her husband. Sara has been subject to similar physical
and emotional abuse and threats with weapons. Both women had been abused by
their spouses in Mexico and feared return to that country. They testified their
husbands could easily find them and presented testimony from an expert that the
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cases handled at both the district and service center levels are treated
differently,3 7 all based on differences of opinion within the agency
Mexican legal system affords no protection to domestic violence victims. But Marta's
case differed in that her situation more closely met with what practitioners would
consider a case of traditional extreme hardship. Her five children ranged in age from
4 to 13, and she was active in her church and other community organizations. Sara on
the other hand had three small children, aged 3 to 6 and was not active in her
community, factors that traditionally would weigh against an extreme hardship
finding. The immigration judges assigned to the cases ruled in favor of both women.
The INS chose not to appeal Marta's case, but did so in Sara's case. Despite evidence
that Sara had suffered severe battery and abuse and that her husband had threatened
her with harm if she returned to Mexico, the INS strenuously argued that she did not
meet the Anderson standard. Ignoring the evidence of abuse and need for protection,
the government argued, "[A]II the children are of tender enough age to adapt
themselves quickly to education, culture, and society in Mexico, where they could
enjoy the support of all their extended family." INS Brief on Appeal at 9. The case is
pending appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Case files on file with the
author.
337 The case of Sara, supra note 1 is further complicated by the fact that after the
INS appealed the immigration judge's decision to grant Sara's application for
suspension of deportation based on a perceived failure to meet extreme hardship, an
INS regional office granted Sara's VAWA self-petition filed under INA §204. The
INS officer who adjudicated the self-petition, based the decision on the same evidence
used at Sara's deportation hearing, and found that she did meet the extreme hardship
standard.In other cases in which the INS regional offices have approved VAWA self-
petition, the local INS district office has reviewed and readjudicated the same
petition. In the case of Nora, another battered spouse, the San Antonio INS district
revoked an approved self-petition based in part on the local office's disagreement
with a regional officer's assessment of the evidence supporting extreme hardship.
(Case file on file with the author). The INS determined that Nora had failed to prove
extreme hardship based entirely on a traditional analysis of extreme hardship:
There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the petitioner's deportation
would result in extreme hardship to her or to her children. The petitioner is a
non-elderly adult. The petitioner indicates she is in good health. The petitioner
has a steady employment history as a cook and as a waitress. A history of
employment in these fields will help her find employment anywhere she may live.
The petitioner is not a member of any persecuted minority. The petitioner is not
the citizen of a war-torn country.
The INS failed to consider any of the evidence that Nora's attorney submitted con-
cerning the emotional and psychological scars caused by the abuse and Nora's need
for protection and support services. Therefore, the government ignored its own regu-
lations and internal memorandum relating to the adjudication of extreme hardship.
In another San Antonio case, that of Esther, the INS again revoked a VAWA self-
petition fied and approved by the designated INS Service Center, and again ignored
the regulations and internal memorandum. (Case file on file with the author.) The
reasons for the INS' finding that Esther did not meet the "extreme hardship" stan-
dard are almost identical to those in the case of Nora:
You are a non-elderly adult. You are, by your own statement, in good health.
You were employed in Mexico for five years at an automobile plant. Therefore,
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regarding "extreme hardship" determinations. Of particular concern to
undocumented battered women is that INS officers in some districts now
routinely review petitions approved by the service centers and, in some
instances, have revoked VAWA self-petitions due to contrary views on
the extreme hardship determination. 8' This effectively undermines the
benefits that a positive adjudication of a self-petition carries.
Immigration judges hearing deportation/removal cases, as well as those
charged with appellate review of denied VAWA self-petitions, have issued
unpublished opinions in cases and determined that the applications failed
to meet a standard for extreme hardship tied to the traditional narrow
interpretation of that term. 3 9 Furthermore, as evident in the arguments
advanced by the INS trial attorneys in briefs discussed at the outset of
this article, the lawyers prosecuting cases against victims of domestic vio-
lence appear to be guided by the body of traditional cases relating to
extreme hardship.
Traditionalists handling cases of Mexican battered women either ignore
the circumstances of the abuse the women have suffered when consider-
ing extreme hardship, or minimize its significance and assign greater
you have had a good employment history in your own country and marketable
skills. You are not a member of any racial, ethnic, or religious minority group.
By your own statement, you have had no political problems with the government
in Mexico. The majority of your relatives are in Mexico (your surviving parent
and your brothers) while your relatives in the United States consist only of a
sister and an aunt.
338 At the San Antonio INS district office, VAWA cases were closely monitored by
the examinations staff, which was acknowledged as such at a December 2, 1997 liaison
meeting between the INS and local immigration attorneys (notes on file with the
author). The adjustment of status cases filed by VAWA beneficiaries have been
assigned to officers who have not been trained in domestic violence or VAWA. They
have also been assigned to review approved VAWA self-petitions, and have revoked
petitions approved by the INS service centers. See supra note 337.
339 In the case of Moira, a Mexican woman represented by the Florida Immigrant
Advocacy center, the immigration judge hearing Moira's application for cancellation
of removal under INA §240A(b)(2), ruled that she did not establish extreme hardship
based on a traditional analysis. Furthermore, the judge opined that Moira's U.S.
citizen daughter who reportedly witnessed the abuse of her mother, "may remain
behind to receive counseling" and that any hardship the child would suffer would be
"the result of parental choice." Decision of the Immigration Judge in the case of
Moira (on file with the author) at 24. The Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU)
which handles appeals of denied self-petitioners, also has issued unpublished
decisions centered on the traditional extreme hardship factors. (Decisions on fie with
the author). The October 16, 1998 memo to Terrance O-Reilly, Director of the AAU,
was in response to the AAU memorandum requesting clarification on the meaning of
"extreme hardship" as used in self-petitioning provisions of the Act. See Virtue II
Memo, supra note 208, at 2. The memo appears to have a positive effect in that on
January 27, 1999, the AAU issued a decision which analyzed the extreme hardship
claim using domestic violence-related factors. (Decision on file with the author.)
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weight to the factors which historically govern the final determination
such as long-term residence coupled with strong community and family
ties. 34° Furthermore, they dismiss concerns that battered Mexican
women need the security of U.S. social and legal services and that they
face adversity abroad.341 Traditionalists opine that Mexican battered
women can escape from their abuser by returning to Mexico, and that
they will enjoy safe haven in their own country.3 42 The hardships of living
abroad are seen as no greater than for other Mexicans, and women must
endure any failure of the Mexican legal and social structures to deal with
domestic violence. This view is best evidenced by the denial of a VAWA
self-petition filed by a Mexican woman who had been repeatedly raped
and abused by her U.S. spouse and expressed fear at returning to Mexico.
[E]veryone living in Mexico must live under the Mexican legal sys-
tem. It is axiomatic that when a Mexican citizen lives in Mexico,
Mexican law applies to that person. While Mexican law (in practice)
may favor men in family relations matters, you have failed to demon-
strate that the situation is so one-sided and extreme as to constitute
anything other than a tolerable social disadvantage.343
These responses to Mexican VAWA cases exhibit more of a concern for
Mexican illegal immigration, a non-issue when it comes to battered
women, and fail to address and find solutions for the emotional and
security needs of the women. The U.S. Supreme Court long ago acknowl-
edged that "deportation is a drastic sanction, one which can destroy lives
and disrupt families. ''3 4 It was Congress' intention when it passed the
immigration provisions of VAWA to address undocumented battered
340 See case files of Nora and Esther, supra note 337, and Maria, infra note 343. In
each case, the INS office at San Antonio denied the womens' VAWA self-petitions on
grounds that they had failed to demonstrate extreme hardship, and in each analyzed
the hardship claim based on traditional factors and ignored any factor related to the
violence they had suffered and their need for protection and services.
341 See case of Maria, infra note 343.
342 In briefs filed in the case of Elena, supra note 1, the INS argued that the
respondent "can avoid contact with [her spouse] simply by leaving the United States."
343 From the March 7, 1997 denial of the self-petition filed by Maria, case on file
with the author. There are other instances in which the INS has ignored or minimized
the hardships Mexican women face. The author and her students have worked on two
cases in which the INS arrested women it knew had been battered and were likely to
apply for VAWA, determined that a high bail bond was warranted, and then detained
the women in a remote detention facility. In one woman's bond redetermination
hearing, the INS attorney arguing against release, and stated that detention of the
woman provided her with safe haven from her abusive spouse. (Case notes on file
with the author.) These incidents further highlight the need for training of INS
officers in the dynamics of domestic violence and VAWA.
141 Gastelum-Guinones v. Kennedy 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963). Deportation may
deprive one "of all that makes life worth living." Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,
284 (1922).
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women's fears of deportation. For Mexican women, those fears center on
concern that they will be forced to return to a country which, now and for
the foreseeable future, offers little protection to its victims of domestic
violence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The extreme hardship standard serves no reasonable immigration-
related purpose with regard to battered immigrants. The term and its
narrow construction in Anderson345 and Wang,3 46 support an orderly
immigration process and a quest to limit the number of individuals who
could gain an immigration benefit following illegal entry or overstay of
lawful entry. It follows that the Board would be reluctant in Anderson to
assign significant weight to considerations of country conditions to hard-
ship determinations. The requirement of proof of extreme hardship and
its restrictive interpretation in cases of foreign nationals eligible for immi-
grant visas but inadmissible due to criminal convictions, prostitution, or
fraud is also consistent with an immigration policy favoring admission of
law-abiding immigrants. The addition of the "extreme hardship" require-
ment is incompatible with an immigration policy favoring foreign nation-
als who meet the eligibility requirements to immigrate, and with a policy
to end domestic violence.
Congress failed in its responsibility to serve the interests of battered
and abused immigrants by including the requirement of extreme hardship
in order to attain legal status.347 VAWA is not about illegal immigration
or the need to protect the United States from criminals and other unwor-
thy individuals. Congress should eliminate extreme hardship altogether
as a requirement for VAWA relief.348 Congress has the opportunity to
115 Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978).
346 INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
347 Congress also failed to define the terms. Congress has often been criticized not
only for the substance of legislation it passes, but in its delegation of lawmaking to
other branches. Heyman, supra note 109, at 866. Congress' failure to define extreme
hardship for VAWA purposes leaves the agency with the responsibility to formulate
the legal standards, a task more appropriately handled by Congress. Id. The
Attorney General has never defined extreme hardship, but rather has given only
limited guidelines. Regulations which govern extreme hardship for self-petitions and
cancellation of removal, should incorporate and assign presumptive weight to the six
VAWA-related factors.
348 Bills pending in Congress would delete the extreme hardship requirement only
for self-petitions. Supra note 93. However, Congress should protect the interests of
battered spouses and children without regard to whether or not they are facing
deportation/removal by eliminating extreme hardship from the self-petition and
suspension of deportation/cancellation of removal requirements. An alternative
approach I would favor would be to replace the extreme hardship standard for
suspension of deportation/cancellation of removal with a more lenient standard. For
example, in her article, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: Legacies of Coverture, Janet
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revisit VAWA and hopefully it will re-evaluate the need to include
extreme hardship.349
If Congress fails to act, then it is incumbent on the Attorney General to
establish clear guidelines for determining extreme hardship based on such
factors as violence suffered by the applicant and the needs she and her
family have for protection and rehabilitation. Courts have been extraor-
dinarily deferential to the agency, dimming the prospect of judicial inter-
vention, but changes made by IIRAIRA to further curtail judicial
intervention in immigration decision-making pose serious obstacles to
review.
The Attorney General has not taken adequate steps to protect VAWA
applicants and prevent disparities in the adjudication of VAWA cases.
Decisions rest with adjudicators and judges who have little guidance
beyond a list of factors which may be considered and who have wide lati-
tude to assign weight to factors as they deem appropriate. Furthermore,
adjudicators of VAWA petitions who rely on Wang and Anderson will
favor those cases of women who have traditionally been found eligible for
immigration relief: those who demonstrate a lengthy residence in the
United States, have school-age children, and engage in community activi-
ties. With no clear understanding of the standards the INS and immigra-
tion courts will apply, VAWA applicants and their advocates can not
predict the outcome of their cases.
Unless the Attorney General pronounces that Anderson, Wang and
their progeny do not control hardship determination in VAWA cases, and
assigns determinative weight to the VAWA-related factors, outdated
interpretations of extreme hardship will undermine Congressional intent
to curb domestic violence. A narrow, restrictive interpretation of hard-
ship for VAWA applicants unable to show the strong ties traditionally
favored, but who have been battered or subjected to incidents of extreme
cruelty will result in the deportation of women the law was designed to
protect. An expansive interpretation of extreme hardship and one in
which the factors tied to abuse and protection are given added weight
serves the Congressional goal to protect immigrants caught in abusive
relationships and to preserve family immigration.
It is fair to assume that Congress delegated the primary responsibility
for interpreting extreme hardship to the Attorney General. She has a
highly sensitive task and cannot ignore the human suffering and the
potential for danger in interpreting extreme hardship harmoniously with
Calvo called on Congress to substitute "substantial" for "extreme" hardship with
regard to the IMFA waiver. See supra note 57, at 637.
349 If Congress were to amend that statute, it would be the first time it has
discarded extreme hardship once is has attached the hardship standard to an
immigration benefit. It would seem unlikely given Congress' hostility to immigrants
over the past ten years that it would pass such pro-immigrant legislation, but it has
been receptive to legislation favoring battered women.
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VAWA. The alarming statistics relating to death and serious injury to
victims of domestic violence in the United States and other countries like
Mexico bear this out.
